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CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

by Joseph de Somogyi

THE traditional line of demarcation between Europe and Asia is untenable both for geographical and political reasons. The ridge of the Ural mountains is as little a natural frontier as are the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles. However, whereas the Ural mountains were till the period of Siberian colonization, i. e. up to the end of the sixteenth century, at least a political boundary of Russia, in the southeast both continents are so closely tied together by the Eurasian chain of mountains that they appear as one inseparable unit. The northwest-southeast trend of this mighty chain of mountains has always been decisive in the destiny of both continents. The west-east range of the Alps is continued in the Dinaric Alps turning to the south on the west coast of the Balkan peninsula and joining the west-east range of the Balkans. Then the mountain chain passes the archipelago of the Aegean sea and is continued in the ridges of the Taurus, the Zagres, and the Sulaiman mountains far into inner Asia where they join the Himalayas. Thus the Eurasian chain of mountains connects Central Europe closely to the Middle East.

The southeastern regions of Europe separated by this vast mountain chain are connected one to another by the Danube and its tributaries. It is politically and economically important that the flow of the Danube to the Adriatic sea is blocked by the Dinaric Alps and deflected to the Black sea, far from the Mediterranean. This fact has had far-reaching consequences in the destiny of Central Europe. Cut off from the Mediterranean by a natural obstacle, the trade routes of this region lead to the Balkan peninsula. One route leads along a deep furrow running from north to south between the Dinarc Alps on the one side and the Balkan mountains and the Thracian massive on the other and following the rivers Morava and Vardar which flow into the Mediterranean at Salonica. From time immemorial it has been the natural trade route between Central Europe and the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

But there is another route which has in the course of time become still more important in international trade. This branches off at Nish from the former route and leads between the Balkan mountains and the Thracian massive and along the valley of the river Maritza to Istanbul. This route has always been the most important land road between the West and East, for it is continued in two arteries of international trade, the one leading across Asia Minor and Iraq by Baghdad to the Persian gulf and the other running along the north coast of Asia Minor to Tabriz where it joins the caravan routes to India and China.

Central Europe and the Middle East turn their faces to each other. The correlations between them have always been so frequent that it has always been difficult to draw a line of demarcation between them.

I

The two river countries, Egypt and Mesopotamia, the cradles of the civilization of the white race, developed very early into great powers. In their prime they had a sway over the whole Middle East between the Taurus and the Arabian desert on the one side and between the Iranian highland and the Libyan desert on the other. They had not advanced to the north beyond Asia Minor and, consequently, had not even known the northern countries. Europe was not known to Egypt and Mesopotamia. Its historical past and settlement began with the Aryan Greeks. The original home of the primitive Aryan nomads was the Danubian region and the adjacent Ukraine. It was in the second millenium B. C. that the Greek tribes penetrated Asia Minor. From the twelfth century B. C. they had settled the Peloponesus and annihilated and inherited the ancient Aegean civilization on both the continent and most of the islands. About the same time they also put to sea, settled in Crete and Rhodes and in imitation of the Phoenicians, established colonies in Sicily and Southern Italy.

The Greeks had no political unity, but only a common civilization. They were in the way of the mightiest power of antiquity, the Iranian Empire. Strengthened by an efficacious traffic system and an unprecedented military organization, Iran, as a typical continental power, had become the deadly enemy of the typically maritime but politically disunited Greek people. Already Cyrus, the founder of the Iranian empire, had taken possession of the whole Middle East including Asia Minor. His second successor, Darius I, intended to advance as far as the Danube and penetrate the Trans-Danubian land of the Scythians. However, his plan miscarried in 521 B. C. He was forced to retire across the Danube. In his retreat his general, Megabazos, conquered Thracia and Macedonia. So the Balkan

peninsula north of the Peloponnese owed its appearance in history to this campaign, although the first attempt failed to link Central Europe to the Middle East from the east. The neglect of Iran to maintain the connection by sea with the newly conquered lands by establishing a strong fleet had its fatal consequences when Xerxes, the son of Darius I, was, despite his conquest of the whole of Greece up to the Isthmus of Corinth, forced to abandon Greece after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis in 480 B. C.

The Greek reaction against Iran and the first attempt at uniting West Central Europe with the Middle East ensued in the following century. The realization of the Greek scheme began with the incorporation of Greece by Philip II of Macedon after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B. C. and ended with his son Alexander the Great. This greatest ruler of antiquity conquered within a decade (334-324 B.C.), the entire Middle East to the Indus. However, in default of an adequate traffic system and an efficient political organization his realm was doomed to the same lot as were the short-lived empires of the oriental despots. After his death it dissolved and thereby the second attempt to unite Central Europe, or at least the Balkan peninsula with the Middle East, into one empire also miscarried. This was allotted to the permanent world power in antiquity, the Roman empire.

Rome started her expansion outside of Italy in the third century B. C. She conquered Asia Minor and Egypt between the Second and Third Punic Wars, adding North Africa in the Third Punic War. This Oriental expansion, continued till the beginning of the second century A. D.,[1] was not difficult, since the empires arising out of the decayed realm of Alexander the Great were declining, making it rather easy for Rome to subdue them. Even though the Roman Empire at the time of its greatest expansion included part of the British Isles in the west and the basin of the Middle Danube in the North, the Romans could never extend its dominion beyond the Euphrates in the east. The Eastern boundaries were so insecure that it was the three eastern provinces of Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Assyria that were lost first. Despite their political talent, their prominent military organization, and their admirable traffic system, the Romans never became aware of the close geographical relations between Cen-

1 The dates of Rome's Oriental expansion are: 171--68 B. C., Epirus; 149-46, Africa, Macedonia, Achaia, Illyria; 133, territories of Attalus of Pergamum in Asia Minor; 75, Cyrenaica; 67, Crete and further territories in Asia Minor; 64, Syria; 58 Cyprus; 46, Numidia; 30, Egypt; 29, Moesia; 25, Pamphylia, Galatia, Lycaeonia; 10, Pannonia, 6, Palestine; 18 A.D., Cappadocia; 46, Thracia; 107, Dacia; 115, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Assyria.

tral Europe and the Middle East. They did not endeavor to take as firm a hold in the Danubian basin on the one hand and in the Caucasus and Iran on the other as they had done in Gaul and Spain. And the fall came from these Eastern lands. In the third century A. D. the Romans had to abandon the basin of the Middle Danube and make the Danube the northeastern frontier of their empire. In the same century the Sassanid empire, heir of the Parthian empire in Iran, became a dangerous concurrent of the Roman empire. However, before a struggle could develop between the two rivals the migration of nations put an end to the Roman empire. In the fifth century A. D. the Teutons and other Germanic peoples invaded the eastern boundaries and the Vandals conquered North Africa.

The Romans made the mistake of having never taken possession of the basin of the Black sea. It had not been attempted before them by the Greeks either, although the economic development of these territories had been their merit. The northern coast of the Black sea, the present-day Ukraine, is made easily accessible by its large rivers, and furnished gold and slaves, raw materials—cattle and hides, then, grain today. From that time the basin of the Black sea has never lost its significance as an important exporting region. This exporting had been for a long time in the hands of the Greeks. Broken as their political power had been in 146 A. D. after the destruction of Corinth, their commercial activity was only temporarily impaired by that event. Very soon it revived, not only because the Greeks were on a much higher cultural level than the Romans, but also because they had settled the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean with people of their own race and could never again have been superseded by the Romans. Thus the commercial power of the Greeks remained unbroken even in the most glorious days of the Roman empire. Had the Romans tied their Danubian and eastern regions more closely to the center of their empire and defended them better, they could very probably have preserved the unity of their empire much longer than was the actual case.

The importance of the Danubian regions and the Middle East to the subsistence of the Roman empire was belatedly comprehended by Constantine the Great, an emperor of Greek origin, when he transferred his seat to Byzance in 330 A. D., thereby unequivocally emphasizing the economic importance of the eastern lands. It was due solely to this economic importance that after the bi-partition of the Roman Empire in 394 A. D. the Eastern Roman empire was able to subsist for a whole millennium despite its weak rulers and maladministration, and it subsisted as long as the Byzantines were able to hold the monopoly of the Oriental trade. And

just as in antiquity, so in the Middle Ages, it was Iran again which found intolerable the commercial power of the Greeks. A struggle started between them which lasted for four centuries. At the outset Iran was victorious. Under the Sassanids in the third century A. D. it had already become master of the whole Middle East and Egypt. But in 626 Byzance got the upper hand. Iran was three times close to conquering Byzance, yet could not avail itself of its victory, for sixteen years later the Sassanid empire collapsed under the blows of Islam.

With Islam there appeared in history the greatest power that has ever conquered the Middle and the Near East. This power stood on a strict religious basis, for which it was more lasting than the preceding military powers. It was by the religion of Islam that the Arabs were united and gained an energy and conquering force which enabled them to subdue the whole Middle East to the Indus and the whole of North Africa, Sicily, and the larger part of the Iberian peninsula. However, neither the Umayyads (660-750 A. D.) nor the Abbasids (750-1258 A. D.) could take Asia Minor, although they made two unsuccessful attacks on Byzance in 672-8 and 717-8. The northern boundary of their empire remained the Taurus, and the occupation of Asia Minor was never realized by the Arabs. Nor were the Seljuks more successful, although their empire about 1100 comprised the lower part of Asia Minor as well as the whole of Iraq, Turkestan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Byzance obstinately defended herself against the Seljuks, whose empire succumbed a century later to a kindred Turkish tribe, the Osmans.

The Osmans in the thirteenth century left their original home, Turkestan, and, wandering to the west, founded their empire under their eponym Osman in Asia Minor and after the death of the Seljuk sultan of Konya claimed also the title of caliph. The actual transfer of the caliphate to the Osmans, however, took place three centuries later under Sultan Selim I. who, after conquering Egypt, made the last Abbasid, a prisoner of the Mamelukes, confer on him the dignity of caliph in 1517. As possessors of this dignity the Osman sultans at all times regarded themselves as imams, i. e., as leaders of the Muslim religious community. Trained in fanaticism by their religion, the Osman Turks aimed to subdue the unbelievers with the Holy War (jihad). It was to this end that they moved out of their tribal home, Asia Minor, to conquer Christendom, i. e., Europe. It cannot be emphasized often enough that the Turkish wars were wars of religion in the true sense of the word.

The fact that the Turks were animated by one faith at a time when

the West was torn by religious quarrels gave them an advantage which was not to be underrated from political and military viewpoints alike. However, the decisive factor was the army organization introduced by Sultan Orkhan (1326-59) which secured for the Turks a permanent infantry and cavalry at a time when Europe had mercenary troops only. Fortunately for the Turks, their opponents on the Balkan peninsula were not strong states. Only Hungary was able to stop the Turks for one and a half centuries, but finally even this stronghold of Christendom fell in the battle of Mohács in 1526. The latter opponents of the Osman empire were afflicted with internal weakness, too. Russia groaned under the Tartars; Poland followed a policy of northern expansion and was held up in the east owing to her personal union with Lithuania at the time when the Grand Duchy of Moscow became free of the Tartar yoke. In the west the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was no longer capable of a lasting display of her strength, and Italy was then but a geographical idea.

Under such circumstances it was easy enough for the Osman empire to take Byzance, Serbia, Wallachia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece, the Crimea, and Tauria under Sultan Muhammad II whose conquests were completed by Sultan Sulayman II who took almost the whole of Hungary with Transylvania, Moldavia, and Bessarabia. The empire of the sultans reached its greatest extension about 1560. However, in the seventeenth century conditions changed to the disadvantage of the Turks. First they made the same mistake as Iran had done—they attributed no importance to the development of sea power. The result was that in 1571 they lost the sea battle of Lepanto against Venice. At the same time the magnificient Turkish army organization became loose and inefficient. Very soon Europe got the upper hand both in military affairs and politics—in military with the formation of standing armies and the invention of firearms, in politics by the Habsburgs gaining France (until then a friend of the Turks) for their cause and by the considerable increase in Russian power. After the decisive defeat of the Turks at St. Gotthard, western Hungary, and their last unsuccessful attack on Vienna in 1683, the Christian states formed the Holy League for the expulsion of Islam from Europe. The first step was the liberation of Hungary in 1699, with the exception of the Banat of Temes which was reconquered in 1718. However, the European liberating armies under the guidance of the Habsburgs, having reached the line of the lower Danube, did not push the Turks farther in the Balkan peninsula. This task developed upon Russia.

Russia became the deadly enemy of the Osman Empire. Both empires were theocracies. Like the Osman sultan, the Czar of All the Russians was

also the head of a Church, the pravoslav Church, to which belonged the Slavs of the Balkan peninsula. The great dream of the czars was the ecclesiastical and political supremacy over the Slavs of the Osman empire. For the realization of this dream Russian policy strove all the more purposefully because it earnestly hoped to seize even Istanbul and the Straits after the death of the "sick man," as the Osman empire was nicknamed, and reach thereby the ice-free sea, a Russian dream which had existed since the time of Peter the Great. As Russia had the same aim also in the Middle East, namely in Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, Turko-Russian antagonism was the dominating factor in the diplomatic history of the nineteenth century. The declining Osman empire found two supporters. The strongest opponent of Russia was Great Britian because the Russian advance to the ice-free sea menaced her vital maritme interests everywhere from Istanbul to Vladivostok. The Habsburg monarchy also took sides with the Turks because a Russian Balkan peninsula would have been a peril to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the second largest Slav power.

Russia took the first decisive step against the Osman empire in 1774 under the Czarina Catherine II, who in the peace of Küchük Kaynardsi extorted Russia's ecclesiastical supremacy over the pravo-Slav Balkan peoples and her protectorate over the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and also acquired the Crimea. In 1821 Russia obtained autonomy of the Serbs, and in 1826-29 she supported the Greek movement of independence in agreement with both Western powers. The "Bulgarian Horrors" of 1876 led to a new Russo-Tukish war and it was due only to the firm attitude of Great Britian that the Russians were stopped before the gates of Istanbul. Owing to British influence, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 restricted its activities to the declaration of the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania only, and the formation of a Great Bulgaria, as designed by Russia, was frustrated. Central Europe was then definitely separated from the Osman empire.

The chronic decadence of the Osman empire and the formation of national states in the Balkan peninsula gave impulse to the progressive Young Turks who from the 1890's agitated for the establishment of a purely Turkish national state. When they took over the government in 1908, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria were on the same day lost to the Osman empire. On October 5th Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and simultaneously Bulgaria declared her independence. Four years later the Balkan countries superseded the Turks on the whole peninsula, with the exception of East Thracia. Of course, this development was highly favorable to Russia's intentions. Czarist Russia had regarded the Balkan states as her vassals which were to help her realize her centuries-old

dream of conquering Istanbul and the Straits. However, she was aware of the energetic opposition of the Double Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary, concluded in 1879, to any Russian move on the Balkan peninsula. This antagonism led to World War I, but it ended differently from what was expected by either side. It radically altered the situation of both Central Europe and the Near and Middle East. It ended with the dissolution of all the three great powers interested in this territory—Czarist Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Osman empire. All three were empires composed of many nationalities which had obtained their independence after the war. The Balkan states, with the exception of Bulgaria, all considerably increased in territory and population and became dependent on Great Britian and France. Turkey lost her Arab territories and became a strong national state which abandoned the theocratic principle of the caliphate and the leadership of Islam and established herself on the European model. But the principle of nationalism also became dominant in the Arab territories, Iran and Afghanistan. Thus in the period between both World Wars nationalism led to state particularism in both Central Europe and the Middle East.

In the development of the political relations between Central Europe and the Middle East, four attempts were made in efforts to create a union between these regions. Three of these attempts originated by Iran, Alexander the Great, and the Osman empires, were made by eastern empires, and one by a western empire, Rome. All these efforts were short-lived, however, with the exception of th Osman try that was the result of a religious war, and all attempts ended in state particularism in both regions.

II

In sketching the economic relations between both regions we come to a different result. This sketch embraces a much shorter historical period than the preceding one because, as a whole, economic interests come into the foreground in modern time only with the development of international trade and transport.

France was the first western power to have economic interests in the Middle East. Under her king, Louis I, she concluded in 1535, a treaty of capitulation with the Osman empire to secure collective personal and judicial privileges for her citizens. It was the pattern of a whole series of treaties concluded within a few decades by all the western powers with the Osman empire. France has regarded herself ever since as the protector of not only her own citizens but of the Catholics of all the other European tween these regions. Three of these attempts originated by Iran, Alexan-

sion of their nation throughout the whole Middle East, in North Africa, and in the Osman Empire, where the three-century-long French economic penetration of Syria finally resulted in 1920 in her League of Nations mandate over Syria. Her lasting influence there has been due, in addition to many Catholic schools, to her capital investment of 200 million gold francs up to World War I. French technicians constructed most of the Syrian ports and railroads, and French merchants purchased the raw materials and domestic industrial products of the country. In North Africa, too, France has a permanent footing, with the exception of Egypt where in 1940 she had to yield to British influence.

The Middle East policy of Great Britain has always been aimed mainly at securing her sea, land, and air connections with India. British political influence began in Iran in 1800, in Afghanistan in 1838, in Arabia in 1839 with the taking of Aden, in Egypt in 1882 with the military occupation of the country. Economic infiltration, however, preceded political expansion in these territories. The Middle East is of utmost importance for Great Britain for the reason that her economic and political interests are inseparably intertwined there. Egypt has been important, not only for the Suez Canal but as one of the foremost cotton-producers of the world. Similarly, Iran and Iraq are not only important links on the trade route to India but are also the richest oilfields in the Old World. For these reasons it can be understood why Iraq was Britain's League of Nations mandate from 1920 to 1932, and Iran was occupied by British troops in 1941 and 1942. In the cases of two other British League of Nations mandates, Palestine (1920-48) and Transjordan (1923-45), the transit trade importance is enhanced by ideal and military considerations of British policy such as the Jewish National Home in Palestine and Amman in Transjordan as a station between Syria and Arabia. In Arabia Great Britain also secured for herself a paramount economic position by influencing the south and east coasts, Oman since 1810 and Hadhramaut since 1905, and by maintaining from the outset friendly relations with King Ibn Saud, "the greatest Arab since the time of the prophet Muhammad..."

The two western powers also established their economic influence north of the Arab world, on Anatexlia and East Thracia, where the victory of Kemal Atatürk in 1922 laid the foundation of a strong nationalist state which has entirely broken with the theocratic principle as embodied in the old Osman empire. Modern Turkey is a very important link between Central Europe and the Middle East Her recognition as such by the western powers became manifest in 1923 in the peace treaty of Lausanne which abolished the four-centuries-old system of capitulations. In the following decade Turkey, by the introduction of radical reforms on western models, became so

strong that in 1932, mainly through British influence, she was admitted to the League of Nations. This marked the starting-point of active Turkish foreign policy. Four years later in the convention of Montreux, she, with British support, obtained complete sovereignty over the Straits. In 1939, she, again with British help, obtained the cession of Hatay, or the Sanjak of Alexandretta, by France as mandatory power of Syria. On October 19 of the same year, at the outset of World War II, Turkey concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Great Britain and France. However, Turkey, averse to entering into unilateral obligations, stipulated in protocol 2 of the treaty that it would not infringe upon her "friendship and brotherhood treaty" with Soviet Russia concluded in 1921. With these treaties Turkey fortified her position in relation to all the great powers interested. In the economic sphere, however, British influence became predominant in the period between the two world wars, and British capital investments contributed to a large extent in the development of Turkey's economic life. Small wonder that all the Middle Eastern states have looked upon the phoenix-like transformation of Turkey's political, economic, and social life as an example to be followed by them. Actually, Turkey has become the leader of the four-power block formed by the treaty of Saadabad on July 8, 1937, between herself, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Just as in the case of Turkey, so in the Balkan States born in the nineteenth century, British and French influence was of a mixed political and economic nature. These countries supported the aspirations to independence of all these states, with the exception of Germanophile Bulgaria, by all means, the most important being by grants of credit. The chief aim of their policy was the creation of strong, independent states in the Balkan peninsula which would efficaciously block the way of German expansion to the east (*Drang nach Osten*). And at the end of World War I when the Central Powers had been defeated, Great Britain and France extended their support to the newly-born Danubian states also in order to stifle any possible attempt to re-establish the Habsburg monarchy. To this end they aided the Little Entente formed in 1921. In the Balkan peninsula they gave support to the Balkan Federation formed in 1934. And British and French investors laid many millions of dollars not only in such countries as were politically supported by their governments but also in the countries devoid of such support, namely Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

It was due to these capital investments, at the outset British and French, later ever-increasingly American, that normal economic life could start after World War I in the new nationalist states in Central Europe and the Middle East. The economic rehabilitation of all these lands, practically all poor

countries, could not come from within but only from without, from the economically and financially best-developed western powers. And this was the essential difference in the political and economic relations between Central Europe and the Middle East, that, whereas the political tendencies to amalgamate these territories into a larger unit came from within (that is, from the states themselves), the chances of their economic revival came from sources outside of these countries. And the economic assistance of the western powers did not aim at creating larger economic units. This was the point in which British and French policy fundamentally differed from the German economic policy.

The Germans of both the Second and the Third empire planned the creation of large economic units which they designed to develop into political units as embodiments of pan-Germanism. Such was the Central European plan of Friedrich Naumann in 1915 which implied the economic fusion of Germany and Austria-Hungary. And such was the Oriental expansionist policy of the Second German empire under William II. Its slogan was the Berlin-Baghdad program with emphasis on common economic and subsequent political interests of Central Europe and the Middle East. As a matter of course, this whole territory was to be regarded as a sphere of pan-German expansion, even colonization. As a symbol of its unity the construction of a direct railroad from Hamburg to Baghdad was resolved as early as 1888 when the Deutsche Bank got a concession for the construction of the line Haidar Pash-Ankara, which was extended for the line Ankara-Persian Gulf by a new concession in 1899. But the German expansionist policy endeavored to dominate the Balkan peninsula. In 1908, after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, it induced the Habsburg monarchy to prolong the Sarajevo-Uvac railroad across newly-occupied Sanjak of Novipazar as the first section of a trans-Balkanic railroad to Salonica. However, this abortive plan had to be dropped in view of the strong opposition to it by all the powers of the Triple Entente.

The outcome of World War I did not end the German expansionist dreams altogether. They were only put aside until the coming to power of national socialism, a novel form of pan-Germanism. Nazi Germany, or the Third empire, enforced her export of ready-made articles and machines on the Balkan states so that in 1928 her export to Bulgaria amounted to 51.9 per cent; to Jugoslavia, 39.4 per cent; to Rumania, 36.8 per cent; to Greece, 30.4 per cent; and to Turkey, 47.5 per cent. These percentages are based on the total import of these countries. Consequently, the export of these countries to Germany increased from 19.9 per cent in 1929 to 39.7 per cent in 1938, whereas their total export to Great Britain during the same period

only increased from 6 to 7.9 per cent. In the case of France there was a decrease from 5.9 per cent to 2.9 per cent, and in the case of the United States a decrease from 7.3 per cent to 4.8 per cent. Of course, this forceful German export policy was successful only in the Balkan states in which a system of compensation in lower grade goods for their export of raw materials could be easily enforced. But it could not impair the foreign trade of the Middle Eastern states east and south of Turkey with their old commercial partners, the western powers.

The collapse of Nazi Germany in World War II frustrated the last attempt to unite Central Europe and the Middle East in one large economic combination. World War II did not bring about such radical territorial changes in these regions as did World War I. The problems to be solved are practically the same in both regions. With or without foreign aid all the Central European and Middle Eastern states must develop their economic resources. Such a policy of internal reconstruction, of course, implies the intensification of their production which may finally lead to the recognition of their common economic interests and the establishment of regional customs unions. History has sufficiently proved that economics always has been a more potent factor than politics in linking together nations of different origin and civilization.

Budapest, Hungary

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL CONTROL IN EASTERN EUROPE

by Kazimierz Grzybowski

ONE of the significant post-war changes in Eastern Europe was the emergence of the Soviet Union in the role of financier and industrial organizer. Before 1939, Eastern European countries, with the exception of Bohemia, the western provinces of Poland, and parts of Hungary, were in the primary stages of industrial revolution. The participation of foreign capital in the industrial economy of these countries was considerable. Soviet and satellite statistics, stressing the economic emancipation of Eastern Europe, indicate that the share of foreign capital in Hungary formerly amounted to about 30 per cent in coal mining and 25 per cent in banking, and that the electrical and chemical industries were exclusively under British and American control.[1] In Rumania one-third of industrial production was under foreign control,[2] while in Bulgaria before the war (1937) foreign investment represented 41.2 percent of the Bulgarian industrial economy. According to Soviet sources, the German share of the economy of these countries increased considerably during the war.[3]

Armistice agreements, the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, and the peace treaties concluded, gave Russia the right to obtain reparations from German and Italian assets in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. According to some estimates Soviet interests acquired in these countries had a value of some 600 million dollars. On March 8, 1947, a decree issued in Hungary enumerated 95 companies, 37 corporations, and 69 private firms and cooperatives which were considered as German assets and were being converted to Soviet ownership.[4] In Rumania, the Soviet Union acquired over one-third of all Rumanian enterprises, 396 industrial and commercial establishments, 33 oil firms, and 97 banking and insurance institutions.[5] Less is known of Soviet acquisitions in Bulgaria. It is certain that, although of lesser magnitude, they were similarly important for the control of the Bulgarian economy, which was far less industrialized than the economy of either Hungary or Rumania.

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1 *Planirovanie Narodnogo Khoziaistva Vengrii* (*Sbornik Materialov*). (Moscow, 1950) pp. 6-7.

2 Konstitutsia i osnovniie zakonodatelniie akti Rumunskoi Narodnoi Respubliki. Moskva, 1950, p. 28.

3 F. T. Konstantinov, *Bolgaria na puti k socializmu,* Moskva, 1949, p. 85, *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (1948) No. 9 p. 36.

4 *Magyar Kozlony,* No 56, March 8, 1947.

Another development occurred simultaneously with Soviet accession to controlling positions in the economies of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. By 1948, all Eastern European countries — Poland in 1945 and 1946, Bulgaria in 1947, Yugoslavia and Albania in 1946 and 1947, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia in 1945 and 1948 — had passed nationalization laws which liquidated foreign investment, including the interests of the Western allies. Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian nationalization laws went into force on the heels of the very peace treaties which obligated these states to respect the property of allied nations.

Soviet experts in international law and political science attached great importance to these developments. On the one hand, in their opinion, the liquidation of the foreign investment of the capitalist nations signified the achievement of full sovereignty by Eastern European nations and the liquidation of 'capitalist tutelage". On the other hand, Soviet control of economic resources in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe furthered the emergence of the new international order in this part of the world. A learned Soviet professor, writing in a leading Soviet legal periodical, expressed the opinion that a new and higher type of international relations, based on a new economic reality, had come into being between the several countries of the socialist system. He was firmly convinced that thereby a solid foundation for the future "universal socialist international law" was being laid.[6]

II

The opinions and policies of Soviet leaders, economists, and planners on foreign investment can be traced to several sources and situations. When still confined to the theoretical contemplation of reality, Lenin was of the opinion that foreign investment was one of the characteristic features of the modern economic system; the world was divided into spheres of influence monopolized by the financial capital of leading industrial nations, which spread their empires to develop and exploit local labor and raw materials and to control markets.[7] At the same time, however, the increment of industrial economies effected through foreign capital he found to be one of the mainsprings of economic progress. The modernization of productive techniques and the growth of the local intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat furthered the cause of the social revolution. Eventually, however, the emergence of the socialist order would end the expansion of foreign capital.

After the October Revolution and the victory of the Bolshevik faction in Russia, Soviet leaders turned to the industrial West for means and technical

[6] F. I. Kozhevnikov in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstuo i Pravo* (1951) No. 6. p. 30

[7] See: Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,* Chapters VII and VIII.

assistance in the reorganization and reconstruction of Soviet productive machinery. As early as the Brest-Litovsk pourparlers with Germany, Bolshevist leaders came to the conclusion that without foreign aid the reestablishment of the Russian economy was impossible. In March 1918, the Supreme Soviet for National Economy discussed methods of attracting foreign capital to Russia. An early decree of the Soviet government (November 23, 1920) set forth conditions for obtaining business opportunities under the new règime. In November 1920, Lenin discussed the question of cooperation with foreign capital at the conference of secretaries of the Moscow Communist Party organizers. From then until the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1927, foreign investment was to occupy a central place in Soviet economic planning.

The opinions, policies, and directives of Lenin and other leaders of the Soviet regime may be summarized as follows: Granting concessions to foreign capital in Russia was a part of the general policy to exploit conflicting interests of the capitalist world. Competition between Germany and other capitalist nations of the West for concessions and business opportunities in Russia would strengthen the position of the Soviet government, increase the hostility between the main capitalist powers of the West and avert their attention from the Soviet Union itself. Foreign concessions would modernize the Russian economy. The Soviet Government, by allying itself with foreign capitalists, sought to further the growth of great enterprises, and to combat antiquated methods of production still common in Russia. The program of concessions was designed to create foundations for the construction of the future socialist order in Russia.[8] Krzhizhanovski, one of the economic planners of the early period, speaking to the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1927, admitted that in the early days of Communist rule in Russia:

> "We . . . then clearly realized that the accumulation of our own resources in industry would hardly be enough to enable us to overcome economic breakdown in industry . . . we reckoned on a wide program of concessions, hoped for credits, and thought that with the help of credit operations and concessions we should manage to wipe out the deficit."[9]

However, there were strings attached to this invitation to foreign capital. First, new concessions were to be granted in such a manner as to avoid the creation of foreign spheres of influence in specific fields of the Russian economy. Secondly, foreign entrepreneurs were to operate within the economic and legal framework established by the Soviet state. New concessions

[8] I. N. Bernstein, *Oczerkh Koncessionnogo Prava SSSR,* Moskva 1930, pp. 7-13. See: Lenin, orks Vol. XVIII, Part 1.

[9] XV Syszd VKP, 1927, Bulletin No 21, pp. 6-7.

were in no way to undo the work of the revolution. Foreign capital invested in confiscated and nationalized enterprises was to remain state property. Although the Soviet Government, unable without assistance to resume production halted by the revolution and civil war, was anxious to return various industrial establishments to foreign industrialists, such industrialists were to be allowed to operate them only on a contractual basis.

A basic conflict of ideas on the methods of economic restoration in Russia was revealed at the Genoa Conference (April-May 1922), in the course of which the Russian delegation endeavored to persuade other delegations that the proper solution of economic problems of Europe depended upon the granting of credits to the Russian government. But Russia would not recognize that a considerable revision of prevailing conditions affecting trade and industry was required to attract foreign enterprise and capital, and its delegation rejected the proposal for the creation of a Court of Arbitration to rule on claims of foreign nationals to restitution of, or compensation for, nationalized properties. All the Russian Government was willing to offer to former owners was "a preferential right in every case where their former property was granted as a concession, whether under the form of a lease, a mixed company formed by the State and the foreign capital, or any other form providing for the participation of foreigners."[10]

The Genoa Conference ended in failure as to the reintegration of Russia into the economy of Europe. The only success the Russian delegation scored was the Rapallo Treaty with Germany, which opened the door for Russo-German cooperation.[11] The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party in 1927, although it did not call for the abandonment of this form of cooperation with the West, stressed the meager results of the campaign to attract foreign capital.[12] As a remedy, the scene was set for a series of five year plans of socialist construction, and the Soviet Government assumed the responsibility for providing capital investment. Soviet exports and the manipulation of the consumer's market in Russia were to provide means for the importation of capital equipment and the hiring of foreign experts. This new phase in the economic history of the Soviet Union brought about a total reversal of their attitude towards foreign investment. Espionage and sabotage trials of foreign experts, and the new wave of expropriations liquidated such foreign enterprise as had agreed to cooperate with the Soviet Government.[13]

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[10] *Papers Relating To International Economic Conference, Genoa, April-May* 1922, HMSO Cmd. 1677, 1922.

[11] Ibid.

[12] ubi cit.

[13] See Nussbaum in *Cornell Law Quarterly,* Vol. 36, No. 1.

Foreign investment again became a highly controversial subject after World War II, when Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe began to take definite shape. After an initial period of collaboration, during which the munificence of the West in the form of UNRRA supplies and assistance provided food for the populations and equipment for the reconstruction of national economies, the Soviet Union switched to a policy of impeding the contacts of Eastern European countries with the Western Allies. On three occasions, Soviet leaders and representatives registered the views of the Soviet Government in that respect in no uncertain terms. Molotov, speaking to the plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference (1946) opposed the general clauses of the proposed peace treaties regarding business opportunities in the ex-enemy countries for the following reasons:

> "If American and British capital had a free rein in countries which suffered heavily during the war . . . such countries would be ruled by private capital in England and America."[14]

A year later, during a preliminary conference of Great Britian, France, and the Soviet Union on the Marshall Plan offer, Molotov restated the position of the Soviet Government. He feared that a united plan including the whole of Europe would threaten the independence of Eastern European nations.[15]

Issues were clearly drawn at the Belgrade Conference on the Danubian question in 1948. The new Danubian regime refused to recognize the acquired interests of the Western Powers in the administration of the Danube, and drew conclusions from the fact that World War II had destroyed the political and economic preponderance of the West in Eastern Europe. The new international regime reflected the new reality and not the obsolete rights of the Western Powers, who no longer influenced the course of history in that part of the world. Old formulations served the interests of imperialism and as such were doomed to disappear. "Law is the instrument of politics, and the reverse theory is untrue" said Vishinsky, the Chief Soviet Delegate to the Conference. Consequently, the Allies' suggestion that the International Court of Justice should be consulted as to whether the 1921 Danubian Convention was still in force, was rejected.[16]

The breach with the West and the formation of the Cominform placed Soviet-Satellite relations in a new perspective. The conference of

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14 Department of State, Paris Peace Conference, Publication No. 2868, pp. 818-819.

15 French Yellow Book, Documents of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR, Paris, June 27-July 3, 1947, pp. 78-79.

16 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX No. 476,477, 480,481. See U. N. Treaty Series, Vol. 33 (1953) No. 518. See: Kuhn, Joseph, *American Journal of International Law* (1929) No. 1, pp. 104 ff.

Communist Parties in Warsaw (1947) proclaimed that in their struggle for socialism, the people's states are assisted by the Soviet Union. The interpretation of this point gave rise to serious difficulties in Soviet-Satellite relations and in the Communist parties of Eastern European countries. Yugoslavia's breach with the Cominform and the resistance of Kostov in Bulgaria, Rajk in Hungary, Gomolka in Poland, and Patrascany in Rumania, mark a crisis in the implementation of the new line. It seems clear now, particularly in the light of the acrimonious debate which followed Tito's defection, that the main issue was to what degree Soviet "assistance" was synonymous with the emergence of the uniform economic plan and with its direction from Moscow.[17]

III.

Long before the outlines of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe became fully visible Yugoslavia made a determined bid to create a sphere of influence of her own. Although Yugoslavia's plan for Balkan federation was directed primarily against the interference of the Western Powers, there are indications that it also aimed at resisting Soviet influence in the Balkans. All elements which came later to be associated with the Soviet system in Europe were there from the beginning: political leadership, economic integration and central direction of the entire area.

After the war, Yugoslavia emerged as the strongest state in the Balkans. Already in December 1944, Tito's government had taken definite steps to revive the idea of the Balkan federation, which under Yugoslav leadership was to provide a new framework for the consolidation of the socialist revolution in that area. With Greece out of reach, immediate plans envisaged Yugoslavia's union with Albania and Bulgaria. By the end of 1945, the former was definitely committed to that course. On July 1, 1946, Albania and Yugoslavia concluded a treaty of economic cooperation, and detailed conventions were signed on November 26, 1946, which provided for the creation of six Albanian-Yugoslav joint stock companies to run for 30 years, for:

1. Railroad construction in Albania, with a capital of 6 million Albanian
2 Oil exploitation, with a capital of 4 million francs;
3. Electrification of Albania;
4. Mining, with a capital of 2 million francs;
5. Export-import, with a capital of one million francs; and a
6. Yugoslav-Albanian bank, with a capital of 6 million francs.

In December 1946 the two parties signed a 30 years agreement to co-

17 Informatsionnoe Soveshchanie Predstavitelei Nekotorikh Kompartii v Polshe, v sentabria, 1947 Goda. Moskva 1948.

ordinate their economic plans and to abolish mutually their custom frontiers. Yugoslavia agreed to deliver industrial equipment and installations on credit to Albania. In 1947, Albanian currency was stabilized on the basis of the Yugoslav dinar.[18]

After the signing of the peace treaties, which were to make the Bulgarian Government independent in its international relations, the Protocol of Bled (August 1, 1947) outlined the plan for economic cooperation, and stabilized the rate of exchange between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Both countries pledged themselves to work out plans for a customs union, and to coordinate their economic plans for all basic industries: mining, electrification, agriculture, and international trade.[19] No further details are available, but it seems that only general agreement was reached. Shortly afterwards the whole scheme was discouraged by Moscow.[20]

Hungary was another Yugoslav partner in economic cooperation. In June 1947, a five year investment agreement was concluded, by which Hungary agreed to deliver industrial equipment to Yugoslavia. On December 20, 1947, the two countries agreed to create a Hungarian-Yugoslav joint stock corporation for the development of bauxite mining and the aluminum industry in Yugoslavia.[21]

Yugoslavia's economic cooperation with Bulgaria and Hungary never progressed beyond the planning stage. In contrast, the Albanian experiment and the political consequences of the Yugoslav investment in Albania's economy, stand out with full clarity. To all practical purposes, the management of Albanian key industries, including transport, and the control of her basic economic resources was in the hands of the Yugoslav Government. Economic planning, foreign trade, and the control of finance were handled by organizations in which representatives of Yugoslavia's economic agencies had the controlling vote on matters which according to all principles of socialist government, should have remained within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Albanian people.

IV.

The degree of Soviet infiltration and control of national economies in Eastern Europe is not equal in all countries. In Hungary and Rumania Soviet influence on economic life is more direct than in other countries. Bulgaria seems to occupy an intermediate position and in Poland and Czechoslovakia economic control by the Soviet Government is exercised by less

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18 Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, Koniunkturnnii Buleten (1947) No. 7.
19 *The World Today*, October 1949, p. 429.
20 Keesing's *Archiv der Gegenwart* (1946-1947) p. 1282
21 *Roumania at the Peace Conference*, Paris 1946, pp. 134 ff.

direct methods. Different again is the position of Yugoslavia. Until her breach with the Cominform, Yugoslavia's economic cooperation with the Soviet Union was closer than that of Poland or Czechoslovakia. After the crisis of 1948, though thwarted and defeated in her ambitions, she managed to preserve her independence.

This varying degree of satellite dependence had several causes. On the one hand, the Soviet Union acquired the ownership of important economic assets in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, which gave it the control of key economic positions in those countries. On the other hand, Poland and Czechoslovakia represented relatively strong industrial units, with less opportunity for extensive foreign investment.

The framework of Soviet investment in Eastern European economics was established in a series of treaties concluded with the nations of that area. On May 8, 1945, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of economic cooperation with Rumania.[21] A similar treaty with Hungary was signed on August 27, 1945, and ratified in December 1945.[22] With Bulgaria, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty on August 23, 1947, calling for the delivery of Soviet industrial equipment. [23] The Soviet Union concluded a technical cooperation treaty on March 5, 1947, with Poland, and a treaty on the delivery of Soviet industrial equipment on credit on January 26, 1948.[24] With Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union concluded a technical cooperation treaty on July 25, 1947, which provided the services of Soviet experts for the organization and management of Yugoslav industries, and called for the delivery to Yugoslavia of industrial equipment on credit. These agreements, however, were denounced by the Soviet Union after Tito's breach with the Cominform.[25]

Soviet cooperation with Czechoslovakia was of a different nature. Although Soviet credits were granted to Czechoslovakia, they were chiefly designed to assure the smooth operation of Czechoslovak industries. The Czechoslovak economy, however, was thrown out of gear due to the fact that directing most of her trade eastwards upset its traditional pattern. Consequently Czechoslovakia ran short of credits needed to purchase the raw materials unobtainable in Russia or within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Of all the Soviet-Satellite economic cooperation treaties, only the Rumanian treaty of May 8, 1945 was published in full. Article 1 of this treaty provided that, "technical services and capital of the USSR shall be used in expanding Rumanian activities . . ." The treaty provided that a Soviet-

22 *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. XXV, No. 374, p. 394.
23 *New York Herald-Tribune,* September 2, 1947.
24 *Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskogo Soiuza* (1948), Part I. p. 49.
25 Keesing, op. cit. (1946-1947) pp. 777 and 1155.

Rumanian scientific institute for agriculture and joint Soviet-Rumanian companies for the management of various fields of industry and mining transportation, banking, etc., should be created. After the conclusion of this treaty, Soviet-Rumanian companies took charge of oil properties, maritime and river transportation, civil aviation, banking, insurance, lumber, natural gas, coal mining, chemical industries, building and construction, the importation of films, the metallurgical industries and tractor construction.

In Hungary, similarly constituted companies represented Soviet interests in river navigation, civil aviation, bauxite mining, aluminum production and processing, and oil properties. In addition, the Soviet Government obtained control of the Hungarian Credit Bank, in all probability outside the compass of the agreement signed on August 27, 1945. Some 40 per cent of the shares of this Bank fell into Russian hands as German assets, and the Soviet Union claimed some 16 or 18 per cent of the shares formerly owned by French interests acquired by Germany during the War.

No treaty regarding the formation of similar ventures in Bulgaria was ever proclaimed or announced. However, a law relative to the creation of the Soviet-Bulgarian Mining Company was made public in 1946,[26] and an edict concerning the registration and privileges of the Soviet-Bulgarian Civil Aviation Company was placed on the statutes in 1949.[27] According to reliable information, a mining company under the name of "Gorsdes", was put into operation at some later date in the Kerdejli area, a shipbuilding company was created under the name of "Korbso," and a construction company, "Sovbolstroi", took charge of the Bulgarian building industry.

After Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia charged the Soviet Union with economic exploitation through the operation of civil aviation and Danubian companies controlling navigation. Nothing was known in the West of the existence of the operation of these two companies prior to their dissolution in 1950. The existence of these companies may be of significance for other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. The fact that the Soviet Union which owned no interests in Yugoslavia practiced this form of joint administration of economic resources in that country suggests that her influence on the economies of Poland and Czechoslovakia may be exercised by similar joint companies.

V.

There is little information about the financing of the Soviet-Bulgarian joint companies. Laws and edicts published in the official gazettes contain no particulars concerning the capital involved, the nominal value of the stock,

[26] *Durzhaven Vestnik,* No. 71, March 23, 1946.
[27] *Ibid.* No. 120, May 28, 1949.

the distribution of stock, and the assets contributed by the parties concerned. Information on the Soviet-Hungarian and Soviet-Rumanian companies is more complete.[27a] Statutes establishing these companies were published in full. The volume of the stock was fixed in the pre-war pengo in Hungary, and although the depreciated pengo was replaced by the forint in August 1946, the capital of a Soviet-Hungarian joint company for the exploitation of aluminum ores and the aluminum industry formed in August 1946 was still fixed in the pengo, although it had long since lost currency. It was only in 1950 that a new oil corporation established its stock in forints.

Of eleven Soviet-Rumanian joint stock companies, the capital of only five has been made public. Four of them had their capital fixed in lei, and the Soviet-Rumanian Lumber Company had its capital fixed at $2,970,000. Since 1946, no particulars on the organization and the capital of the new companies have been made public.

The history of Soviet economic expansion in the form of the joint stock companies seem to indicate the following: Foundations of Soviet investment in Eastern Europe were in most cases provided by the Soviet-acquired German and Italian assets. These assets gave the Soviet Union a foothold which it exploited to widen its influence. The first step was to form joint stock companies and to force the government of the three ex-enemy countries to bring in government owned assets in respective fields of economic activity. At times only satellite contributions to the formation of joint stock companies represented real values. The Soviet share in the Soviet-Hungarian Bauxite Company, for example, was in the form of the Soviet claim to German financial advances to Hungarian industries during the War. This claim originally estimated at 200 million dollars, and eventually reduced to 45 million dollars, was based on the theory that sums advanced to various Hungarian firms to finance their production for the German war machinery were of German origin. In fact they came from the Hungarian Credit Bank, which settled its accounts with German authorities or firms when the deliveries were made.

After the peace treaties came into force and nationalization laws were passed, the field was clear for the next step of Soviet economic expansion in Eastern Europe. Everywhere, where joint stock companies were in existence, the tendency was to extend their control over the rest of industries in which they were anchored. A typical case is the post-war history of the oil industry in Rumania. The Soviet-Rumanian Convention of May 8, 1945, on the formation of the Sovrompetrol, listed as the contribution of the Rumanian party,

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[27a] *Ibid.* No. 256, of Nov. 10, 1950. *National Zeitung* (Basel, Switzerland) reported in No. 178 of 1950 the creation of another, purely Soviet, company engaged in the mining of uraninum ores in Bulgaria

certain oil companies (mostly privately owned), certain oil bearing lands, and 50 per cent of the oil royalties due from private producers to the Rumanian Government. The Soviet contribution consisted of a number of companies acquired by the Soviet Union as former German assets and an unspecified amount of oil equipment. However, after the agreement was signed, two companies, representing more than two-thirds of the Soviet contribution, were recovered by Dutch, French and Belgian Governments, as owned by the nationals of their countries and improperly listed as German assets. The equipment which the Soviet Government agreed to deliver as its share in the common venture consisted almost exclusively of machinery stripped from those companies by the Red Army as war trophies. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the Rumanian contribution of the two companies, Redeventa and Creditul Minier vastly surpassed the Soviet contribution, the Rumanian government agreed to increase the percentage of oil royalties transferred to the Soverompetrol to 75 per cent. In 1948, a new agreement between the Soviet Union and Rumania concerning the operation of the Soverompetrol was signed. Among other provisions, it gave all oil royalties to the joint stock company.

In 1946 and 1947 the share of Sovrompetrol in the entire production of Rumania represented some 30 per cent. After the Peace Treaty entered into force and the nationalization law was enacted in 1948 additional companies were merged with the Sovrompetrol, and the latest estimate is that it controls 98 per cent of the Rumanian oil.[28]

There were similar developments in other industries of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Of particular interest and importance in connection with Soviet control of the national economies of Hungary and Rumania was the reorganization of banking, with the resultant concentration of certain banking activities in the hands of Soviet controlled banks. In Hungary the General Credit Bank obtained a monopoly for the distribution of industrial credit, and became the main financial institution for the implementation of the five-year plan. In addition it finances all foreign trade. In Rumania, the situation is very much the same. After the reorganization of the Rumanian financial system in 1948 and 1949, the Sovrombank became the exclusive credit and investment bank for Rumanian industry and foreign trade.[29]

Joint companies are organized according to a general pattern uniformly followed in all Soviet-controlled countries. Both partners own an equal number of shares. They have an equal voice at general meetings of share-

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[28] *Roumania at the Peace Conference*, p. 234 ff. *Crorica Romaneasca*, January-February 1952, p. 86.

holders, on the Board of Directors and on the Auditing Board. The Chairman of the Board of Directors and the deputy manager of the Company are invariably satellite nationals, while the deputy chairman and the general manager are Soviet nationals. The provisions of the statutes are so drafted that concurrence of Soviet and satellite partners is required for the decisions of any of the collective managing bodies. In case of a conflict between Soviet and Satellite interests and a consequent stalemate in the Board of Directors, or in the General Meeting of shareholders, the manager has all powers to decide the issue in favor of Soviet interests. Statutes of the joint companies invariably give the general manager the power to acquire, dispose of, and mortgage the company's assets, and to give credits. Only when these activities transcend the usual conduct of business must they be executed according to rules issued by the Board of Directors. He may act in the name of the Board of Directors without any special authority. On the other hand, the deputy general manager, a national of the satellite country, is authorized to act in the absence of the general manager only strictly within his instructions.

VII

Vishinski, describing the nature of the Soviet Government, emphasized that:

> "Soviet state administration is an indissoluble unit of administrative and economic government, a differentiation in principle of the Soviet state machinery from that of the bourgeois state. Extended to all sides of the economic and social life of the people, Soviet state administration is one of organizational creativeness.[30]

In effect, since Soviet shareholders in joint companies are branches of the economic government of the Soviet state and Soviet nationals in positions of control in joint companies are likewise representatives of the respective economic ministries of the Soviet government, Soviet participation in the administration and management of satellite economic resources amount to participation in the government of the country. With the balance of control heavily tilted in favor of the Soviet interests, joint companies represent extraterritorial enclaves subject to the overriding decision of Soviet authorities.

The extraterritorial position of joint companies within the satellite administration is strengthened furthermore by the fact that joint companies are exempt from all taxation, duties, or fees in connection with

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[30] Vishinski, *The Law of the Soviet State*, New York, 1948, p. 369.

their properties, transactions, and business, even those normally due from state industries. As Yugoslav complaints seem to indicate, although the profits are equally shared, deficits and losses are made good exclusively from state budgets.

Soviet control of national economies through joint companies far exceeds specific fields of industrial activity. Soviet controlled industrial credit and investment banks in Hungary and Rumania are far more than the name would normally imply. The handling of industrial finances in the socialist state, when all industry is stated owned, and of national investment in the execution of the economic plans is the function of government. It is linked with government control of the execution of economic plans by industrial groups and single establishments. How intimate is this control is demonstrated by the regulations in force in Rumania which provide that in case production figures of a given enterprise fall short of the planned targets, money advanced must be reduced accordingly.[31] But this is not the only aspect of Soviet control of satellite affairs through joint companies and activities of the Soviet-satellite banks. The Sovrom Bank and the Hungarian Credit Bank finance the foreign trade of these countries. This again involves control of, and influence on, the government trade policy.

Thus claims that Soviet-satellite joint companies contribute to the sovereignty of the satellite states assume a Pickwickian sense. It is one of those pieces of reasoning so often found in Soviet writings. According to more orthodox criteria, however, the Soviet system in Eastern Europe rests on a substantial limitation of the independence of the popular republic. There is no difficulty in recognizing the pattern and principle on which this limitation is engineered. The Soviet constitution assures the federal government of control of economic resources of national importance. Industries of local importance are left to the lower levels of socialist government.[32] The same pattern is repeated within the Soviet bloc. Air transport, Danubian navigation, oil, heavy industry, and machine construction are centrally controlled for the entire area.

Joint stock companies, however, are effective only in areas where the Soviet Union has physical control of the economic resources. On a wider scale another instrument was needed.

By 1947 the main factor in Eastern European politics and economies was the growing estrangement of Eastern Europe from the West. If before

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32 See Sections 14 77-78 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, Cf. Vishinski, op. cit. pp. 281-282.

1938, Eastern European heavy industry and engineering, with the notable exception of the Czechoslovak industry, were of no great significance within European economy, with the Soviet Bloc they assumed a new importance. The economic potentialities of Eastern Europe had to be reassessed and readjusted in the perspective of developed economic resources with the Soviet Block. Their importance was further increased when East-West estrangement reduced the flow of industrial equipment and capital equipment among other reasons made imperative the central control of all economic activity and of all channels of distribution in the entire area. In January 1949 the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance came into being. Its functions may be determined as coordination, integration and specialization. One of the leading planners of Eastern Europe, describing the aims and methods of Soviet-satellite cooperation, summarized the new economic policies in Eastern Europe in plain terms: The conclusion of long term economic agreements favors economic plans which take into account not only the needs of individual countries, but also of their neighbors, economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and her satellites in Eastern Europe leads to a planned integration of their economies. Every country develops the branches of production which are most suitable to it, and which have the greatest chance of success in view of the needs of friendly countries.[33]

The overall and most obvious effect of the Council's activities was that intersatellite trade and economic cooperation were also pressed into the framework of central control. The achievements of the new system are gradually becoming evident in the economic specialization of individual countries. For instance it is clear that latest economic plans of Bulgaria have abandoned all pretence of creating an industrial economy, and the Bulgarian government has begun to concentrate upon developing her agriculture along Soviet patterns. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia is being gradually refashioned into a heavy industry unit. Poland has been transformed into a steel producer. Hungary specializes in the production of Diesel motors, electrical equipment and aluminum.

After the formation of the Council of Mutual Assistance, when Soviet control reached a certain point in distinctions between various forms of international economic cooperation, such as foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign credit tend to disappear. Under the current system foreign trade, investment and credit are treated in Eastern Europe as instruments of socialist planning, administration and of distribution.

Looking at the present situation from the historical viewpoint it

[33] Minc, in *Pravda,* September 25, 1951.

would seem that the current economic policies in Eastern Europe represent a trend away from economic autarchy, and self-sufficiency which underlay Eastern European economic policies between the wars. It may seem at first sight that the causes which compartmentalized Eastern Europe have at last been removed. In point of fact, however, the old concept of autarchy has been replaced by the new economic autarchy and self-sufficiency, and Eastern European nationalism by Eastern European socialism.

Washington, D. C.

MODERN GREEK GOVERNMENT
II. THE REALITIES*

by Harold F. Alderfer

In the first article on present-day Greek government, the constitutional and fundamental pattern was outlined. The form of the Greek State had been transplanted from 19th century Europe bent upon breaking up the decadent Turkish empire and re-establishing its sway in the Near East. But it must be added that as the Turkish imperial curtain was being lifted from those lands that four hundred years before had been a part of the Byzantine empire, no other form of government existed to fit the needs of emerging racial elements. Not only Greece, but all the modern eastern Mediterranean and Near East nations, even Republican Turkey, adopted Western governmental institutions and practices. The need for such a pattern in Greece was evident during the early years after the declaration of independence in 1821 when local chieftains threatened to dissipate the fruits of liberation by personal and internecine squabbles over control and actual confiscation of the property of the Turks including the village lands of Greeks who helped fight the revolution. The actual operation of government where foreign forms are used by a freed people without a background of freedom and democratic procedures is always of interest and in Greece it is especially important at this time. Therefore, this article is devoted to the realities of governmental operation in the modern Greek state.

The Ministry

From its majority, the Chamber of Deputies forms a ministry, what is known as "the government." This is headed by a prime minister who, as leader of the party or coalition in power, heads the government and names his fellow ministers with the help of the leaders in Parliament. Except in rare cases, the ministers are members of the Chamber of Deputies, duly elected by their constituencies. The ministers head the various ministries or departments of government. The King appoints the ministers but they are responsible solely to the majority in Parliament. When the prime minister and his ministers meet collectively, they are known as the Council of Ministers, but each minister is responsible individually for what is done in his department. There are at present sixteen ministers. They are: the Presidency of the Government, the Ministers of Coordination, National Defense, For-

* Part I of this study appeared in the January 1953 *Journal*.

eign Affairs, Justice, Interior, National Education and Religions, Finance, Commerce, Public Works, Communications, Agriculture, Social Welfare, Mercantile Marine, and Labor. In addition to these there are several undersecretaries who may be appointed in the office of the President, Vice President, and the Ministers of Finance, Communications, and Foreign Affairs, the latter permanent, who assist the ministers in their duties. Also, there are ministers without portfolio and the Governor General of Northern Greece who have cabinet status. All together compose the Council of Ministers, which collectively is responsible for the operation of the government.[1]

When the ministry wants to test its strength in the Chamber of Deputies, it calls for a vote of confidence. Likewise, if a majority vote against a certain measure proposed by the ministry, that is construed as a lack of confidence and the prime minister and his colleagues resign. The King in conference with the political leaders, asks another leader to form a government and if he can secure a majority, he is named prime minister and he, in turn, names his cabinet with a view of representing as strong as possible a majority in the Chamber.

The prime minister in the Greek government, while a leader of the majority party or of an important one in a coalition, is not really a powerful figure in government. In the first place, he is merely *primus inter pares* among his ministers. He has no ministry of his own and little or no patronage. He does not choose all of his ministers for if there is a coalition each party making up the coalition is given a number of ministers according to its parliamentary power. He cannot fire them without creating a major parliamentary crisis which might overthrow the government. He cannot even choose the ministers from his own party without a great deal of conference within the ranks. However, by the influence of his own personality he may build himself up as a leader in fact as well as name but the number of prime ministers of recent decades who were able to do this has been small indeed.

The Council of Ministers takes decisions of the highest political level and those that need governmental agreement across the board. It has acted more in the nature of an emergency body than a permanent, methodical agency to iron out differences between ministries and develop governmental unity. In present-day government, the individual ministers are quite independent.

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1 Emergency Law No. 1671 Re: Ministerial Councils and Ministers, January 27, 1951. Also for a general description of Greek national administration see United States Bureau of the Budget, Public Administration in Greece, 1947.

The relations between the Chamber and the Ministry constitute the chief weakness of modern Greek government. Most "governments" are short-lived and, therefore, it is virtually impossible to get stability in the operation of administration. There were forty-eight governments between 1920 and 1928; in the early days of the monarchy, nine governments in one seven-month period; in 1950, eight governments during the year. In 1928, there were thirteen active politicians who at one time or another had been prime minister, one six times and another three times. From 1829 to 1928, there were forty-seven different prime ministers, one holding the position sixteen times; from 1829 to 1928, there were eighty-seven ministers of foreign affairs;[2] for the six years ending in 1951, there were forty ministers of welfare. No matter what confronts the Greek State, governments rise and fall in dull, meaningless, and ridiculous succession. It seems impossible to achieve stability through the institution of the European parliament-ministry system, and it must be noted that the Metaxas dictatorship was the first serious effort to get along without it. While it achieved some success in promoting projects and carrying on a more efficient administration, it did nullify some of the individual liberties of the citizens much to the discontent of the general public. While it toyed with the idea of evolving the institution of group representation, nothing ever came of it and the government remained authoritarian. It is extremely doubtful whether the dictatorship would have brought permanent stability.

The ministers as heads of their departments are for the most part even more impotent than they are as members of the "government." All know that they are working against time and, therefore, want to do everything that will redound to their political future. So they build a lot of political fence: receive endless streams of visitors from the public (a Greek politician must be always available and accessible); make as many public appearances as possible (he is usually full of long-winded oratory); do as many favors as possible for his constituency and the powers that be. Naturally, he cannot make much of a dent on the problems of his ministry and, because he must sign every document and approve every action no matter how minor, the normal administration of the ministry is slow, confused, and amateur. The permanent staff of the ministry is headed by a director general. He and the rest of the staff are continually carrying on an underground, running battle with the minister to see who actually is running the ministry. The permanent staff, which is made up of hardened bureaucrats, extremely wise in the ways of obfuscation, cynical yet fearful, shuffle papers with such legerde-

[2] Miller, William, *Greece*, 1928.

main that the minister is completely in the dark about the actual operation of his department. Frequently, he is baited by the staff, which cannot be removed, with a remark that perhaps the next minister might like this particular action or that. There are, of course, some exceptions to the general run. But as a whole, Greek ministers are completely ignorant and uninterested in administration *per se*. But when one sees at close range the minister-bureaucrat battle, one feels sorry for the poor minister even though he has the opportunity of spreading his plumes for a day. It is a case in which the front and rear echelons have almost no communication.

Legislation

While the Chamber of Deputies is the basic legislative body, it shares the law-making power with the King and the Ministry, for the King must sanction laws by his signature, which he does at the instance of the Ministry, and the Ministry has decisive power in the selection of legislation to be considered by the Chamber. Legislation can be divided into several classes.

In the first category are the constitutional acts. These relate only to constitutional questions; that is, to provisions that are dealt with in the Constitution. They do not actually amend the Constitution but can be classed as legislation relating to constitutional questions. For example, an Act passed in 1925 gave the Minister of Finance power to cut budget items when not enough funds were available in the budget. This contravenes the right of the Chamber to authorize the budget as provided for in the Constitution. Again, an Act in 1948 outlawed the Communist party and provided measures to deal with it. This deals with the individual right in the Constitution relating to freedom of association. A constitutional Act can be passed only by a revisionary parliament by a simple majority. It cannot be repealed by an ordinary parliamentary law but only by another Act. It is initiated by the will of a two-thirds majority calling the president of the Chamber to pass an Act.

The second category of legislation contains parliamentary law. This law relates to any question except one that is constitutional and is passed by a simple majority either by an ordinary or by a revisionary parliament. Most legislation is in this category. It is usually introduced by the "competent" minister after a favorable decision by the ministerial council. Individual deputies may introduce legislation but unless they belong to the majority, this is usually fruitless.

Before 1952, there was a third category called emergency laws. These were laws formulated by the competent ministry and approved by the minis-

terial council and put into force while the Chamber is not in session. While originating as a necessity, this practice has been abused by ministries individually and collectively until the authority of parliament has been reduced and all but nullified. By this method, parliamentary law was amended, changed or emasculated by ministerial action and so rendered null and void. The Constitution of 1952,, as noted before, has tried to correct this situation. By implication, emergency laws were outlawed although they never had had constitutional recognition. Now emergency matters are passed as legislative decrees.[3] It requires that when the Chamber is not in session, a legislative committee composed of one-fifth of the members shall be on hand in Athens and that all legislative decrees, which originate in the same manner as emergency laws did, shall be approved by it with a two-thirds majority. What happens when a legislative decree is not ratified immediately seems to be an unresolved question at the moment. The ratifying Chamber may appoint a committee to study it and if the committee declares it not to have been an emergency problem, the law is null and void. How well this will work to end one of the worst abuses in the system of Greek government time and experience alone will tell.

The fourth category is the royal decree. Authority to make this is specified in a particular law. It contains details of administration that carry out the provisions of the law. It is made by a competent ministry or any other agency designated in the law, sometimes more than one agency. It is what one might describe as "executive ordinance making power."

The Greek State does not want for written law. In fact, most fields of law are so cluttered up with laws, decrees, amendments, repeals and other legal paraphernalia that the real law cannot be discovered and the easiest way to get some action is to make a new law, decree, or amendment. It is not uncommon for one minister to have an emergency law or decree passed in a field affecting another ministry and months later to have the second ministry find it out, be outraged, and immediately have passed a new law or to have issued a new decree. This legislative jungle adds to the general clutter of Greek government and is one means whereby the bureaucracy can keep control of the State. Law as such is not a sacred thing in modern Greece.

Top-Level Government

Superimposed upon the basic parliament-ministerial system are a number of *ad hoc* bodies that may, for want of a better name, be dubbed "top-level committees." While established by law, these committees tend to di-

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[3] *The Greek Constitution*, Art. 35.

minish the power of parliament and of the Ministerial Council. The most important of these is the Currency Committee, created by the Greek-British London Agreement of 1946. Members of this committee are the Ministers of Finance and Coordination, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, and one British and one American representative, all with equal votes. This body has broad powers to control the issuance of new currency, the extension of credit and the sale of gold. Through these powers it has an overriding control of Greek government finances and activities. Another such committee is the Foreign Trade Board, made up of five Greek ministers, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, and an American representative, the latter with a vote, whose function it is to establish the policy for the most effective use of all foreign exchange, public and private, available to the Greek economy. This includes dollars earned from Greek exports and services, Marshall Plan aid, and private contributions from abroad. This foreign exchange is used to buy necessary items from abroad and this board decides what items are most necessary. Enforcement of these policies is carried on by the Foreign Trade Administration, which is a separate directorate of the Ministry of Commerce, headed by the American member of the Board. Still another such body is the Central Loan Committee, with an American member, which controls loans to private business and for agricultural projects made from funds available through American aid.

Other efforts to achieve more integration between virtually independent ministries by the establishment of committees with *ad hoc* powers have been made. One such is the High Civil Service Board created in 1951, made up of members of the permanent service, with powers to develop certain personnel services for all branches of the national administration. Likewise, the Tobacco Committee, made up of five ministers *ex officio*, has been given powers to make decisions relating to the growing, merchandising, subsidization, and exportation of tobacco. Its administrative and research agency is the Autonomous Tobacco Organization.

The Minister of Coordination has been granted powers to integrate the administrative activities of the government through the establishment of three directorates: One for general economic planning, one for the coordination of the Marshall Plan program, and one for the development of modern organizational and management techniques and procedures. Likewise, the Minister of Finance, through constitutional provision, has been given power over finances and budget that are broad and restrictive.

All these developments have been toward the objective of bringing some order and unity out of a chaotic system where ministers are indepen-

dent of each other, where administrative leadership is non-existent, and where politics is ever changing.

The Bureaucracy

There are approximately eighty thousand employees in the various services of the Greek national government. About ten thousand of these are temporary, that is, having no permanent status although in reality many are regular employees. The rest are permanent and are guaranteed security from dismissal and demotion by the Constitution. Since 1927, the number of government employees has more than doubled. Many appointments were made during occupation years for purposes of relief and political reward. Since the war, relaxation of the prewar standards for making appointments has led to a serious deterioration in efficiency. Recruitment of employees has always been carried on by each ministry. The recent establishment of the High Civil Service Board has provided the possibility of building up central administration of examinations and the other personnel servicing so badly needed.

All personnel, except technicians and specialists, are divided into eleven standard grades ranging from director general, down progressively through directors class A and B, section chiefs class A and B, rapporteur, secretarial clerk class A and B, attache or assistant, and clerk class A and B. In addition, there are a number of servants. The pay law of 1950 established base scales for director generals at 2,800,000 drachmae or $186 a month and for clerks B 570,000 drachmae or $38 a month. Ministers plenipotentiary, resident ministers and general secretaries, the latter political assistants to ministers, receive higher base pay than director generals but none exceed 3,600,000 drachmae or $240; while ushers classed as servants receive as low as $22 a month. Cost of living indices from 1940 to 1950 rose from 109 to 312, while salary increases in comparison remained as low as 185 The effect of these low salaries and the high cost of living has created measures to increase take-home pay by means of overtime pay, pay for committee meetings, bonuses, family allowances, longevity increases, all of which have added somewhat to total incomes. Extra employment is taken wherever possible. Likewise, free medical attention and a liberal pension system help somewhat, but it is difficult to understand how the average employee with a salary of $70 a month can live.

The major segments of public employment are in schools and churches—one-third of total; in the Ministry of Finance—one-eighth; in postal, telegraph, and telephone services—one eighth; in relief and supply services—one-eighth; in the Ministry of Justice—one-tenth.

A frank, competent, and constructive evaluation of the Greek Civil Service was made for the Greek government by Mr. K. Varvaressos, former Governor of the Bank of Greece and considered as the nation's top economist, at the behest of the Plastiras government in January, 1952.[4] Analysing the present condition, he stated that (1) there was a large surplus of civil employees in some services and a shortage in others. Generally speaking, the regional offices are undermanned, whereas, in Athens there is an excessive number, many of whom are useless. (2) That the senior civil servants have not lived up to their positions during the occupation and postwar years and were willing to become agents of party and personal interests. This has led to a serious deterioration in the equality of the administration, and indifference to public interest, which has spread down to the junior officials. (3) That numerous appointments of civil servants were made during the past decade without examination of ability and character from which has evolved a new type of employee—ill-trained, indifferent, and incompetent. (4) That "red-tape" has now reached a new low, in many cases to the point of systematic, deliberate delay and harassment of the public.

Mr. Varvaressos' report suggests the steps that should be taken: (1) The top-ranking and senior civil servants who contributed or did not object to the bad administration during the past ten years should be removed from active service. (2) Superfluous and incompetent employees should be removed. (3) Salaries should be re-adjusted to allow civil servants to cover their basic living requirements so that they might dismiss from their minds "the feeling that they are outcasts of Greek society." (4) Enforcement of discipline in the civil service and exercise of control over their activities. (5) Appointments and promotions of civil servants free from political and personal interference. (5) The abolition of arbitrary action on the part of state services and the development of general principles of administrative action. Power should not be granted by law to the administration to regulate on their own free will through the means of "ministerial decisions." (7) Administration in the provinces should be reorganized and strengthened.

The report also points the way these reforms must be accomplished. The program cannot be the responsibility of one party nor be carried on by political persons. Mr. Varvaressos suggests the appointment of a High Committee for the Reorganization of the Administration, composed mostly of judges and university professors. The urgent importance of civil service improvement at the earliest possible moment is indicated when he says: "Ac-

[4] *Varvaressos Report*, unofficial English translation available in Civil Government Division of the Mutual Security Agency, Greece.

cording to a general admission, the State machine is so defective at the present time that it does not only fail to fulfill extra duties dictated by foreign aid granted to our country but even fails to accomplish satisfactorily the elementary functions of the State as, for example, the collection of taxes on which the existence of an organized society depends. Many measures have been adopted and many programs have been prepared in the past with the expectation of remedying the instability already existing in the country and to improve the economic situation. Nevertheless, in all these cases hopes which have been based on these measures and programs have been frustrated because of lack of efficient application thereof. *I am completely convinced that no actual improvement of the economic situation of the country will possibly occur in the future unless this basic problem of deficient functioning of the State machine is duly faced."*[5]

It is doubtful if any competent and impartial observer of the Greek bureaucracy would deny either the facts or oppose the recommendations of Mr. Varvaressos, strong as they are. The operation of national administration in Greece has especial significance to Americans because it is the vehicle through which American aid is administered. The characteristics of the administrative activity, despite the fact that there are many competent individuals in the permanent service and despite the fact that the quotient of intelligence and the number holding university degrees is high, are: (1) The tremendous confusion in administration brought about by the necessity of layers of approvals by committees and individual administrators. When any action stops, it is difficult to find out where the obstruction is. One might almost say that much of this is premeditated as a means of asserting authority on the part of second-rate bureaucrats. This results in that kind of delay which breaks the back of any program and the heart of the conscientious administrator. (2) The always ridiculous and often terrifying centralization of authority in the entire bureaucracy with power in the hands of officials totally unacquainted with conditions in the field or with the substance of the operation. (3) The difficulty that young aggressive men have in getting ahead in the service. (4) Ignorance all around of the elemental concepts of public administration. (5) The constant lack of results.

State Finances

The Greek State has reported budget deficits at least from the year 1933.[6] Nor is the indebtedness record any better. According to an Ameri-

5 *Ibid.*, p. 150. The italics are Mr. Varvaressos'.

6 *Budget Message For Fiscal Year* 1951-52 by the Minister of Finance, Mr. George Mavros, presented on July 16, 1951, to the Parliament of the Hellenes, Kingdom of Greece, pp. 2-3.

can Mission survey, no payment of the principle of any foreign loan was made since 1830, and interest payments were made only in thirty of the 122 years.

The financial picture of the fiscal year 1950-51 well illustrates the recent pattern of Greek State finances. According to Mr. Mavros' *Budget Message* of 1951-52, the "expected final receipts" from Greek sources were 4,46 billion drachmae or roughly $300 million. Of this, 24% came from direct and income taxes, 26% from customs duties, 10% from a turn-over tax on business, 16% from tobacco consumption tax. 3% from alcoholic beverage consumption tax, 5% from revenue of state monopolies, 10% from stamp duties and consular fees, 4% from automobile, entertainment, and special taxes, and 2% from miscellaneous sources.[7] The total expenditures for the fiscal year 1950-51 were 6,192 billion drachmae or about $413 million. This indicates a difference between local revenue and Greek State expenditures of about $100 million.[8] Of this total expenditure, 54% was spent by civilian ministries. The Ministry of Finance, with more than half of this amount, was by far the largest civilian expending agency in the government. The Ministry of Religions and Education, which carries the expenditures for churches and schools throughout Greece, expended 430 billion drachmae, roughly $23 million; the Ministry of Justice, about $10 million; the Ministry of Welfare, $18 million; and the Ministry of Health, about $17 million.

For public security, 420 billion drachmae or $28 million was spent. This included the gendarmerie, the city police, the fire service, and national expenditures relating to rural security and alien administration.

The Ministry of National Defense, including Army, Navy, and Air Force, spent 2,266 billion drachmae or $151 million. This includes Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as expenditures for common use items, that is, items purchased through the Greek State for both civilian and military *materiel* and equipment. In addition, the ministry spent about $12 million for additional reconstruction expenses not covered in the regular budget.[9]

It is estimated that of the total expenditures, $125 million goes for salaries and $40 million for pensions, which together make up 38% of the total expenditures.[10]

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7 *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

8 According to estimates of the American Mission, the 1950-51 deficit was only about $87 million due to the extraordinary proceeds in June, 1951, the last month of the 1950-51 fiscal year.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

10 These figures, while taken from Mr. Mavro's *Budget Message*, cannot be con-

The Greek government has, of course, been faced with tremendously difficult financial problems arising out of international conditions not of their own making. German and Italian occupation during World War II, communist-inspired internal revolution and guerrilla warfare took a tremendous toll of their resources. Inflation caused many large and small fortunes to disappear overnight. In addition to these, probably at least partly because of them, efforts of the government toward recovery have been characterized by a lack of confidence in the future and an unwillingness to grasp the ready implements to eliminate internal weaknesses retarding improvement. Then came the Korean War and increased military necessities to burden the Greek State, followed by a decrease in American aid and the direction of its main efforts towards military defense and economic production. Added to all these is the underlying poverty of the Greek nation, its low per capita income—$130 per capita[11]—and the social and economic derangement caused by the absorption of a million-and-a-half Asia Minor refugees after the military debacle of 1922, so it is impossible to expect self-sufficiency.

Nevertheless, there are some problems in public finance that could be solved by energetic action on the part of political leadership and the government itself. The first of these is tax evasion. It is generally known that a large share of income taxes is not collected and that a still larger share is not even assessed. American Mission stimulation has led to the recent enactment of the registration of corporate shares, the ownership of which has hitherto been unknown and hidden. Likewise, the Ministry of Finance has an antiquated system of tax assessment and collection, the characteristics of which are confusion heaped upon confusion what with committee on committees for hearing of appeals and deciding tax obligation. The result is that an undue burden of taxation is shifted from the rich and well-to-do classes to the middle and poorer groups. It is estimated that 33 per cent of the income of these less favored groups is absorbed in taxation.[12] Mr. Varvaressos has this to say: "The valuable point of the Greek taxation system is not its excessive burden, but its inequitable distribution. The indirect taxes which fall on the consumers at large and consequently hit disproportionately the small incomes represent approximately 80 per cent of the total State proceeds. This has always been the outstanding feature of the Greek tax

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sidered as accurate summaries of the finances of the 1950-51 fiscal year, but they are close enough to indicate the nature of both the Greek State revenues and expenditures.

11 Germany $400, France $500-$600, United States of America $1,600 as quoted by *Vararessos Report*, p. 2.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

system and one of the main causes of social inequality and of social antagonism in the country . . . As I mentioned before, our rehabilitated production and the American aid mean that the total of the incomes formed in the country is much higher than in the prewar period. We all know that those classes are those engaged in commercial and industrial enterprises. The fact that these classes realize large incomes cannot be proved exactly by statistical data because they do not carry out their tax obligations. In any case, it can be ascertained that they live a very much more prosperous life than prewar, which for a poor country like Greece constitutes provocative luxury, and that, furthermore, they effect large savings in the form of gold sovereigns and by the importation of funds to foreign countries, while before the war many of the present prosperous businesses just managed to cover expenses."[13] Mr. Varvaressos estimates that the prewar national income was 67 billion drachmae and that the State took twenty per cent. During the 1950-51 fiscal year, the national income was estimated at 25 trillion drachmae or $1,666,660,000 from which 4.5 trillion drachmae, or nineteen per cent, was collected by taxation. If American aid is added, the taxation percentage to national income is reduced to 16 per cent. Mr. Varvaressos points out that the nation draws off less than 2 per cent of the national income.[14]

The second basic problem is the evil of third party taxes, those that are levied for the benefit of certain classes or groups of people. Probably nowhere in the modern world is this system as highly developed. Most of them came into being since 1920 when the resistance of the State to organized groups was especially low, but they do characterize two governmental qualities of the Greek system, namely, the intense search to find benefit for individual groups as against the nation as a whole and the sly manner of a confusing and hiding administrative techniques designed to achieve particular benefits. The average Greek has little or no faith in the State as an entity, merely as a tool to get some benefits, individual or group. He is completely cynical about it and acts accordingly. From data collected by the Ministry of Finance, it appears that 1,564 organizations receive third party taxes, usually in the form of a tax, license or fee, most of which have no connection with the source of the tax. The revenues from these taxes are usually not included in the state budget but are specially administered and automatically financed. It is estimated that $100,000,000 is raised in this way each year, but in the words of a former Minister of Finance, Mr. Mavros, in his 1951-52 *Budget Message*, "The State has never been able to determine exactly the identity of these

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

organizations, the number existing in the country, the amount of these social charges, how much revenue is collected, how it is managed . . . The management, outside the budget, of such a large amount derived from the same sources as taxes of the State, from incomes of the community in general, constitutes a characteristic disorder in our economy and makes the control of our national income impossible. Furthermore, if we take into consideration the fact that a large part of the revenues of such organizations is spent for administrative expenses, one may understand of what little service some of these organizations are to their members who, although they receive insignificant or no assistance from their own organizations, have to carry the burden of taxes of the remaining 1,563 organizations, of which they are not members." It is estimated that from nine to twenty per cent of all revenue goes into administrative expenses. Illustrative of these organizations are the following selected at random: The Pension Fund of Employees and Editorial Personnel of Thessalonika Newspapers receives .60 to 1.50 per cent on the sales of Thessalonika newspapers and .7 per cent on the value of all paid newspaper advertisements and notices. Annual revenue derived: $12,805.[16] The Stock Exchange Brokers Pension Fund receives 4 per cent retention on the commissions received by banks on foreign exchange certificates. Annual revenue derived: $8,762. The Merchants Pension Fund received one-half per cent on the value of imported goods, which amounted to $200,000 before it was abolished in 1948. The Pension Fund of Customs Brokers receives dues on each import document to the person effecting a customs clearance or bill of lading and from a special stamp on customs document. This amounts to more than $50,000 annually. The Insurance Fund of Businessmen and Small Industrialists receives 10 per cent on all court penalties imposed on businessmen and small industrialists. Revenue comes to $675,000. The Pension Fund of Professional Chauffeurs receives the proceeds from a special stamp tax on automobile license taxes and on private driver licenses and a twenty-three-cent-a-month "contribution" of all drivers not members of the organization receiving the benefits. The Union of Samos Wine Making Cooperatives gets an additional percentage of a state tax imposed on wine, netting $14,000 a year. The Technical Chamber of Commerce received two-hundreths of one per cent on amounts received by contractors for the erection of public, non-military and non-religious, works amounting to $20,000. The Welfare Fund of Athens Lawyers receives 15 per cent on the amount derived from conver-

[15] These examples are taken from a survey made by the Division of Finance and Program, MSA Mission to Greece.

sion of penalties, 5 per cent on the capital of establishing statutes of corporations, a lawyers special stamp on documents, and fixed amounts on cases of detention and imprisonment. Revenue derived totals about $50,000 annually. The Employees Health Fund of the Telegraph and Telephone Service receives a special fee on telegrams and telephone calls. This amounts to about $75,000 a year.

One of the main Greek enterprises has always been shipping. It is well known that most of the tonnage owned by Greeks is flying under a foreign flag, especially that of Panama. It is said that were all Greek shipping under the Greek flag, the nation would have a merchant marine second only to that of the United States and Great Britain.[16] The only Greek merchant marine force are the hundred Liberties and seven tankers sold by the American government to Greek shipowners under a guarantee of the Greek government, the payment of their value being secured by a mortgage. The reason for this situation is probably two-fold: the taxation and regulation policy of the Greek government which drives owners out of Greek jurisdiction, and the overpowering Greek compulsion to attempt to dodge tax obligations. This has resulted in substantial losses to the Greek State, and one that should be rectified at the earliest possible moment.

Decentralization and Local Government

It is ironic to hear in the territories of Northern Greece liberated from the Turks in 1912 the plaint of local government officials: "We had more and better local government under the Turks." By that they mean more freedom, more self-government, more powers, more revenue. The Turks, once law and order was maintained and central taxes and tributes paid, gave little attention to the Greek population. They allowed them freedom of religion, language and local government. Local self-government was exercised through the commune whose governing body was a council of the "old heads," including the clergy, the lay members of which were elected or at least approved by the inhabitants at yearly meetings in the church of the commune or village. Communes of many villages were often joined into one organization. The functions of these communes were broad—anything they desired that was not in opposition to the will of the Turkish governors of the district—and included religion, education, roads, health, welfare, and even economic enterprise.

The governmental history of Greece since liberation from the Turks is one of centralization of authority at the top and the virtual extinguish-

[16] Six million gross tons under foreign flags reported by Minister of Merchant Marine to Parliament, July 24, 1951.

ment of local self-government at the bottom. It is this condition that has been one of the reasons for the governmental and administrative impotence of the Greek State. In 1833, King Otho and his Bavarian advisors brought down the French system by which monarchies, eparchies, and demarchies were set up in a hierarchical system in which the King and his ministers had ultimate authority over all activities. The executive officers of these entities—the monarchs, eparchs, and demarchs—were suggested locally but appointed by the King. They were central government functionaries rather than local executives. Each of these areas had also a council elected locally but with few powers or financial resources. Their every action had to be approved by the central government. This was not local government, Greek or even Turkish style, but was European in character and not indigenous nor applicable to Greek mentality, background or conditions. Came the revolution of 1852 and great hopes for decentralization. But the result was merely the constitutional guarantee of election of local councils. In 1889, monarchies were granted definite powers in agricultural improvement and education and over local government, but they did not flourish because their acts had to be approved by the central government and they had no independent financial resources. The republican leader Venizelos desired to further the cause of local governments in 1912 and broke up the demes, which consisted of a large number of individual communes and settlements. It is said that he wanted to abolish the political prestage and power of the strong demarchs. In the 1912 law, demes and communes are established as local government entities, the former being the more urban towns, the latter the rural settlements. The law gave these units general but not specific powers in local government but kept them at the mercy of the central ministries which kept their powers and financial resources at a minimum and made them virtually impotent through the development of a vast array of centrally made and executed laws, decrees, regulations, vetoes, approvals, and prohibitions. Most of the remaining powers in education, religion, police, irrigation, as well as of taxation and raising of revenue, were taken away from them or absorbed by the central government. The Constitution of 1927 contained a provision guaranteeing local government but this was abrogated in 1935. The Metaxas dictatorship abolished local elections. Central authorities appointed all local officials from 1936 until 1951. During that period only a few vestiges of local self-goverment remained. Greece was the most highly centralized of the "free" nations after the war; the national government took 95 per cent of all governmental revenues.[17]

17. Civil Government Division, Economic Cooperation Adminstration, *Facts on Greek Lcal Government,* Athens, Greece. 1950.

The new territories of Crete and Northern Greece ceded to Greece in 1912, demanded administrative decentralization, and were supported by the Venizelist republicans. Accordingly, five governor generalates were established in these new territories. The nomarchies continued to function throughout all Greece and were the prefectures of the central government in the various regions. Their local powers vanished in thin air and their councils were abolished. Eparchies also lost their administrative powers in all but a few localities.

As of April 1, 1952, there were five governor generalates, 49 monarchies, 9 active eparchies, 220 demes and 5,766 communes. The first three are considered as regional authorities of the central government, under the direction of the Ministry of Interior; the latter two are considered as units of local government with councils and executive officials elected by the people. Only the demes and communes have power to raise revenue, the others are financed strictly as central government agencies.

Local government revenues from locally raised sources come from taxes on agricultural products; licenses, fees, and dues of a miscellaneous character; contributions assessed by local councils; and personal work of the inhabitants limited to ten days a year. In 1951, a law was passed giving demes and communes 50 per cent of the revenues of the state-collected tax on tobacco consumption. This was to be in lieu of 120 billion drachmae to demes from several centrally collected sources. The total visualized was 320 billion drachmae but this amount as of February 1, 1952, was cut down to a total of 240 billion drachmae, representing an increase of $100 billion over the previous year. For the first time in the history of the modern Greek State, the communes received some return of state-collected taxes.

The Greek Government and American Aid

Relations between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece in the matter of American aid to Greece are based upon agreements signed by the two sovereign States.[18] Marshall Plan aid was given to Greece to be expended largely through the national government. But in order to see to it that every possible care was to be taken for the good administration of these grants, which from 1944 to 1952, totalled approximately $2,000,000,000, the American Mission was established in Athens

[18] Agreement on Aid to Greece between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece, signed June 20, 1947; Economic Cooperation Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece. July 2, 1948; and the Agreement of Januray 7, 1952, amending the former agreement in line with the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82d Congress, setting up the Mutual Agency in place of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

with a number of field offices throughout Greece. Broadly speaking, it is the function of the American Mission to do the following things: (1) to encourage measures to promote financial stability within the Greek economy; (2) to offer advice and assistance in developing the productiveness of Greek economy; (3) to advise with the Greek Government on military affairs; (4) under the leadership of the American Ambassador to act as a liaison between the Greek Government and that of the United States; (5) to survey and report on progress in the use of American aid and to offer suggestions for improvement; (6) to account for the expenditure of American aid; (7) to offer advice and assistance in making the Greek Government the best possible vehicle for the use of American aid and to develop those ideals of democracy and efficient public administration in the Greek Government to the end that the nation would become a strong link in the chain of free nations throughout the world.

It is the last function that comes within the present consideration The burden of this function falls primarily upon the Division of Civil Government of the Mission but all other divisions, especially the Division of Finance and Program, are involved. The line divisions of the Mission: Construction, Food and Agriculture, Industry and Transportation, Labor and Manpower, Public Health, have specific responsibilities in relation to the spending of American aid for particular projects. Whenever they feel that the spending of American dollars calls for an improvement in the administrative procedure, the Civil Government Division takes official interest, studies the particular problem with the line divisions who jointly make certain recommendations to the Greek Government. As such recommendations are nothing more than advice, the responsibility for accepting them is clearly with the Greek Government.

On a broader plane, the Civil Government Division has been interested in a general improvement of Greek administration and has made intensive studies and detailed recommendations, many of which have been adopted by the Greek Government.

First, the number of ministries in the Greek national government has been reduced from twenty-two to sixteen, thus eliminating unnecessary top-level administrative organization. Allied functions have been merged in order to achieve smoother integration. Second, a number of ministries have undergone an internal reorganization to streamline their operation. Third, the Ministry of Coordination has been implemented with three new divisions, one to develop economic planning, a second to integrate administration of Marshall Plan aid, and a third to improve organization and management procedures within the entire government. Fourth, key

civil servants have been sent to the United States and England to learn Western methods in public administration. Fifth, a High Civil Service Board was established with the function of providing central personnel services for all the ministries of the national government. A new civil service code and a new local employees code were also passed. Sixth, a Central Statistics Bureau was established in the Ministry of Coordination. It was furnished with modern machinery and took a major part in handling the returns of the 1951 census. Seventh, the Nomarchs have been taken out of politics, put on a merit basis, given more powers, and also given a three year tenure. Eighth, local elections were held for the first time since 1934 in April, 1951. They provided the basis for the revitalization of local government so necessary to the Greek State.

The leadership within the American Mission for improving the financial administration of the Greek Government is taken by the Division of Finance and Program. The main function of this division is to cooperate with the Greek Government in programming American aid and formulating the Greek budget. Improvements in financial administration brought about include the mandatory registration of stock shares in order that that form of wealth may be made accountable for its just taxation, the development of modern budgetary practices and forms, and the streamlining of the local revenue system within a new law which included the sharing of the national and local government on a fifty-fifty basis of the proceeds of the tobacco consumption tax.

Other developments in governmental improvement far enough along at this writing to hold out hope of acceptance by the Greek Government in the near future include the abolition of a host of third party taxes, an increased consolidation of financial reponsibility within the Ministry of Finance, reorganization of the Ministry of Interior and a revision of its duties relative to the Nomarchs and the local units of government which come under its jurisdiction, the adoption of a completely new local government code, more democratic, more modern than the present one adopted in 1912, the amalgamation of small communes which cannot carry on governmental activities because of their size and lack of revenue, the establishment of a program of in-service training for local officials and employees, implementation of the entire government with modern personnel methods, organization, and management, and the abolition of the governor generalates in the new territories of Greece.

All in all, American efforts have in the course of four years made considerable changes in the organization and operation of the Greek Government, whose main characteristics were instability, centralization, and in-

effectiveness. But a great deal more must be done to achieve that excellence and quality which public administration in the modern problems demands.

Critique

It is apparent that there are fundamental weaknesses in the Greek Government system that extend to society itself. First, a firm belief in government as an institution for general welfare does not exist. Second, government does not give services to the people in proportion to what they pay for in taxes and other tribute. Third, the more fortunate classes are not carrying their fair share of the national burden. Fourth, people try to get on the government payroll not for a career but to obtain a modicum of security. Fifth, the techniques of modern administration are almost entirely absent. Sixth, there is little hope that administration can be improved under present conditions without stimulation from sources outside the Government itself. Seventh, centralization has reached an absurd and ridiculous extent.

It is altogether possible that Western ideals of government cannot permeate the Greek mind deeply enough to make possible real political stability and bring about modern administration. Perhaps the old Byzantine background featuring centralization at the top level but communal independence locally is more natural. If so, every effort should be made to revitalize the local units of government at least to the effectiveness that existed under the Turkish regime. Likewise, future expenditures of large amounts of American aid should be predicated upon a much closer administrative control on the part of the American Mission, in fact, probably actual administration in most cases with Greek personnel under American direction. Likewise, full-scale efforts to build into the government modern implements of management and personnel should be a condition of American aid. Greece can be saved from a totalitarian fate, but not without the democracy envisaged in her fundamental institutions or without the techniques that modern government finds indispensable. Greece as a nation did make great progress from 1834 to 1941; it can do it again, for the Greek people are alive and the State is a real entity, not an international pawn or dummy. The Greeks love their freedom, they are determined to keep it. The Greeks as individuals are tough, enduring, patriotic, and intelligent. Therein lies the hope on which to build.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE

(DOCUMENTS)

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PARIS (SEPTEMBER 3, 1918)

Victor S. Mamatey

RELATIVELY little is known about precise circumstances and motives of recognition by the United States Government of the Czechoslovak National Council of Paris in September 1918.[1] The recognition as a *de facto* government of this revolutionary committee was a bold measure on the part of President Woodrow Wilson. Though Thomas G Masaryk, the Council's president, was a well-known political figure, it was impossible for the Americans to verify before the end of the hostilities to what extent this organization was representative of the true sentiments of the Czechs and the Slovaks. It was also an unprecedented measure in the history of American diplomacy, and the technical details of its execution are consequently interesting also from the point of view of international law. It seems therefore fitting to this writer to publish the American documents relating to this act of the United States Government which will permit its minute reconstruction.

The origins of the American recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council were tied to the decision of the United States Government to participate in the Allied intervention in Siberia. Suggestions to intervene in Siberia—with the aid of the Cossacks, the Japanese, and others—had been made since as early as the Inter-Allied military conference, held in Paris between November 27 and December 3, 1917.[2] President Wilson firmly opposed these suggestions for both practical and moral reasons. Together with the American military men, he thought that the main objective of the intervention, i. e., the re-establishment of the eastern front, was unrealizable and that interference in Russian internal affairs was incompatible with his liberal program. Moreover, he had little confidence in the Japanese disinterestedness. Nevertheless, the Entente Governments, hard-pressed by the Germans, who could after Brest-Litovsk concentrate all their forces

1. Masaryk discussed the subject briefly in his war memiors, *The Making of a State, 1914-1918* (London 1927), p. 272, and Rev. Jaroslav Frazek treated it more at length on the basis mostly of Czech documents, in his doctoral dissertation *Woodrow Wilson a americké uznání čst. Národní rady za vládu de facto* (Prague, 1933).

2. John A. White, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton, 1950), pp. 11 ff.

on the western front, persisted in demanding that something be done in Russia.[3] In this dilemma, the sudden appearance of the Czechoslovak legionnaires on the Siberian scene in May of 1918 seemed to the American policy-makers like a veritable *deus ex machina*. When, on June 13, 1918, the suggestion was first made to President Wilson to use the Czechoslovaks for the control of Siberia, he commented: "There seems to me to emerge from this suggestion the shadow of a plan that might be worked, with Japanese and other assistance. These people (i. e. the Czechoslovaks) are cousins of the Russians."[4] When, on June 25, the commanders of the Czechoslovak Siberian Army asked for American and Allied aid, after having wiped out the Vladivostok Soviet and having decided to return westward to clear the Siberian railroad of the Bolsheviks, Secretary of State Robert Lansing rushed the message over to the White House with a purple tag IMPORTANT.[5] Here at last was a possibility to intervene in the Siberian imbroglio with a strictly limited and morally justifiable objective of but coming to the rescue of a hard-pressed gallant little army. The decision to intervene was taken in response to a formal request of the Supreme War Council at Versailles at a conference held on July 6 in the White House in which, besides the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations participated.

The Allied Ambassadors were informed of this decision on July 17, but it was withheld from the public until an agreement could be arrived at with the Japanese to limit their intervention force to 7,000 men, the number of troops the United States Government proposed to send to Vladivostok. Nevertheless, Masaryk, who had been laboring in behalf of the Czechoslovak cause in the United States since May, must have had some

3. See entries in Lansing's diary: April 30, 1918: . . . [Assistant Secretary of State William] Phillips on persistency of Balfour for intervention in Russia . . ." May 10, 1918: " . . . French Amb. on Siberian situation. Told him no change of policy . . ." May 11, 1918: " . . . Lord Reading still persisting in getting our consent to intervention In Siberia . . ." The Diaries of Robert Lansing (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).

4. Wilson to Lansing, June 17, 1918, United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers*, 1914-1920, 2 vols. (Washington, 1939-1940), II, 363. Hereafter cited as *The Lansing Papers*. The whole collection will be cited as *Foreign Relations*.

5. Lansing to Wilson, June 28, 1918, The Wilson Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress), covering enclosed radiogram of Admiral A. M. Knight, commanding the *U. S. S. Brooklyn* at anchor in Vladivostok, to Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels, June 26, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, *Russia*, 2 vols. (Washington 1931-1932) II 230-231.

6. ibid., pp. 262-263; Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, 8 vols. (New York, 1927-1939), VIII, 562.

inkling of what was afoot, perhaps through the French Ambassador Jules J. Jusserand, who gave the Czechoslovak statesman much guidance in Washington. On July 20 he addressed to President Wilson and to the Acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk, a memorandum "Help to the Allies to the Czechoslovak Army in Russia Necessary."[7] In the covering letter to Polk he formally asked for the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council: ". . . I think that this recognition has become practically necessary: I dispose of three armies (in Russia, France, and Italy). I am, as a wit said, the master of Siberia and half Russia, and yet I am in the United States formally a private man . . ."[8]

On August 3 the Japanese Ambassador at last informed Polk that his Government had agreed to cooperate in the Siberian intervention in accordance with the conditions set by the United States Government.[9] A statement prepared by the President announcing the intention of both governments to send forces to Vladivostok to safeguard "the rear of the westward moving Czecho-Slovaks," was then at once released to the press.[10]

The American public took at once a lively interest in both the Siberian adventure and the Czechoslovak movement for independence. On August 15 *The New York Times* discussed in an editorial entitled "The Czechoslovak Nation," the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council by the British Government, [11] released to the press on August 14, and urged the United States Government to concur in this action. On August 19 Lansing at last took up the matter in a long letter to the President in which he counselled against granting "full recognition to the Czecho-Slovaks as a sovereign nation." Instead, he proposed two possible manners of granting limited recognition. One was to "recognize the belligerency of the Czecho-Slovak revolutionists in view of their military organization operating in Siberia and Eastern Russia . . . and the Czecho-Slovak Council with Masaryk at its head as a *de facto* Revolutionary Government." Another . . . to issue a general declaration that the United States Government "is prepared to advance the cause of national freedom by assuming relations

7. Masaryk to Wilson, July 20, 1918, enclosure, The Wilson Papers.
8. *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Suppl. 1 2 vols. (Washington, 1933); I, 818.
9. ibid., *Russia, II,* 325-326.
10. ibid., pp. 328-329.
11. The British recognition, dated August 9, stated in part:
"' . . . Great Britian regards the Czecho-Slovak as an Allied and belligerent army waging regular warfare against Austria-Hungary and Germany.
"Great Britian also recognizes the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the supreme organ of the Czecho-Slovak national interests, and as the present trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government, to exercise supreme authority over this Allied and belligerent army." ibid., *1918,* Suppl. 1, I, 824.

with any council or body of men truly representative of revolutionists against the Austro-Hungarian Government, who seek national independence by force of arms.[12]

To this letter Lansing added a summary of the previous general expressions of sympathy for the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav causes, issued by the United States Government on May 29 and June 23, 1918, and a memorandum prepared by Albert H. Putney, Chief of the Near Eastern Division in the Department of State, which follows:

BOHEMIA DE JURE AN INDEPENDENT ELECTIVE MONARCHY

The Bohemians stand in a different position from any other subject people who are asking the assistance of the United States in securing their freedom and independence.

For many centuries prior to the election of Ferdinand of Austria as king of Bohemia in 1526, Bohemia had been an absolutely independent country and for a considerable period prior to this date it had been an elective monarchy. The election of Ferdinand as king of Bohemia was for the sole purpose of uniting the forces of the two countries to resist the Turks and it was not intended that there should be any permanent union of Bohemia and Austria or that the elective character of the Bohemian kingship should be abolished.

Bohemia has never at any time since 1526 given its consent in a constitutional manner to: (1) the union of Bohemia and Austria: (2) the governing of Bohemia by a legislative body meeting at Vienna; or (3) making the succession to the throne of Bohemia hereditary in the house of Habsburg. (The right of Bohemia to be thus considered as an independent country is fully discussed in my memorandum of May 9th, the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, particularly in Section 7 and to some extent in Section 5).

A very effective war step for the United States to take would be to declare that: (1) we regard Bohemia as an independent elective monarchy: (2) that the present Habsburg government of Bohemia is unconstitutional and an usurpation and that therefore the Bohemians have the right to resist such government without being guilty of treason; and (3) that in the absence of a government of Bohemia which is both de jure and de facto the United States recognize the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the true representative of the Czecho-Slovak race.[13]

On August 22 President Wilson replied and agreed that the time had come to take "definite action in this important matter." He expressed preference for the first of the two alternate solutions proposed by Lansing and instructed him to draft a public announcement to carry it out.[14] In turn Lansing requested the opinion of the Department's legal counsellor, L. H.

12. *The Lansing Papers,* II, 139-141.

13. Lansing to Wilson, August 21, 1918, enclosures, Files of the Department of State (National Archives). Putney's memorandum of May 9, 1918, on the "Slavs of Austria-Hungary" was a comprehensive 85,000-word legal and historical study of the subject.

14. *The Lansing Papers,* II, 141.

Woolsey, on precedents and a suitable manner in which the recognition could be carried out. On the following day Woolsey submitted a memorandum and a draft announcement which follow:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY August 23, 1918
RECOGNITION OF CZECHO-SLOVAK BELLIGERENCY

Dear Mr. Lansing:

Perhaps I should set forth the policies which appear to have guided the United States in its recognition of belligerency during the last century:

(1) Recognition of belligerency is regarded as the recognition of the fact of a war between the country whose belligerency is recognized and another country.

(2) It is generally held by the courts and by the executive that a recognition of belligerency must rest upon a public proclamation of the President or some public act by necessary implication equivalent thereto, such as a declaration of blockade, proclamation of neutrality, et cetera.

(3) Recognition of belligerency by the United States has generally arisen on account of its neutrality in wars between other countries, in which event the recognition of belligerency has generally been by means of a proclamation of neutrality. I have examined such proclamations by the United States during the war between Spain and her colonies in South America, during the Franco-Prussian War, and various other wars, but they are of little assistance in the present case. I have also examined the proclamations of neutrality of other countries in the Civil War with the same result.

(4) The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down the steps leading up to recognition of belligerency as follows:

> "When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerent, and the contest as war."
>
> (Prize Cas. 2 Black. 635; Willams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176)

Premature recognition that is not justified by necessity has generally been regarded as an unfriendly act and as a demonstration of moral support to the insurgents. This was the attitude taken by the United States with respect to the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States by Great Britian and several foreign countries, even though the United States by its declaration of blockade, had itself first recognized their belligerency and accorded them belligerent rights. As a general rule, the recognition of belligerency has been accorded where the rights of the United States or its citizens have been affected by hostilities, such as interference with vessels on the high seas or overland trade wih a contiguous belligerent. Where warfare is limited to land, there is less excuse for recognition of belligerency.

(5) The United States, however, has maintained that every sovereign power decides for itself on its own responsibility the question of whether or not it will, at a given time, accord the status of belligerency to the insurgent subject of another power, as also the larger question of the independence of such subjects and their accession to the family of sovereign states. But the right-

fulness of such an act requires that it be "deliberate, seasonable, and just, in reference to surrounding facts." (Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, September 25, 1869). President Grant stated the principle in these words, in reference to Cuba:

> "The principle is maintained, however, that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people struggling to free themselves from the Government they believe to be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other."
>
> (Message, December 6, 1869)

(6) The effect of recognition is to absolve the mother country from the responsibility (if any attaches, which some authorities doubt) for the acts of the insurgents, and to hold the insurgent government responsible for its actions. Recognition also has the effect of according the belligerents the rights of war, such as visit and search, confiscation of contraband, institution of blockade, et cetera.

The foregoing is a brief, rather technical discussion of the legal aspects of the matter, which I have set down as being well to have in mind when action is taken in respect to the Czecho-Slovaks, but not necessarily applicable to the Czecho-Slovak situation, which has many new and unique features.

After reflection, it seems to me that the recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks may be by proclamation of the President if it is designed to make it formal and emphatic, or by an official announcement of the President if it is desired that it should be given less dignity and importance. Our recognition of the Polish Council in Paris was, as I recall, announced rather informally. The proposed recognition of belligerency might be combined with the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Council in Paris, of which Professor Masaryk is president, or the two may be made separately. In any event, recognition of the Council should precede or be synchronous with the recognition of belligerency.

I have attached a draft of an announcement, which contains data that may be worked over into something desirable.

L. H. W.

(Per V.)

ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROCLAMATION

Since the Kingdom of Bohemia has, notwithstanding the recognition of its independence by the Hapsburg Dynasty, never been granted its rights as an independent nation, but, on the contrary, has for centuries been made a vassal of the Empire of Austria-Hungary, and the Czecho-Slovak people oppressed in the enjoyment of their civil and political liberties, and

Since this bounden people have declared their independence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and reaffirmed their allegiance to their own country, and have accordingly established the Czecho-Slovak National Council, with headquarters in Paris; and

Since the Council has been recognized as the official organization of the Czecho-Slovak people; and

Since this Czecho-Slovak Council organized and put in the field a large

force of troops now fighting for liberty and on the side of the Entente Powers in Russia, and organized and equipped Slavic legions for service on the eastern front — all with the aim and purpose of engaging in the present war against their former oppressors and would-be sovereigns:

The Government of the United States (or the President of the United States) therefore deems it fitting in this public manner to recognize the Czecho-Slovak Council, of which Professor Masaryk is the president (or head), as a *de facto* revolutionary government, entitled to enjoy the privileges, exercise the functions, and discharge the obligations of a belligerent government engaged with the United States and associated Governments in the common war which they are prosecuting against the Imperial Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary.[15]

On the same day, August 23, Lansing invited Masaryk to his office for a discussion of the Siberian situation and the recognition of the National Council.[16] The conversation ended in an agreement that Masaryk would furnish the Secretary of State memoranda on both problems as well as a copy of the British recognition of August 9.[17] Although determined to go through with the recognition, Lansing still had important political and legal reservations to it which he committed to the following memorandum:

MEMORANDUM ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS AS A NATIONALITY

August 23, 1918

There is being exerted in the press and by many sympathizers strong pressure to recognize the Czecho-Slovaks as an independent nationality adopting the course taken by Great Britain, France and Italy.

This sympathy, mingled with admiration is the natural consequence of the heroic and romantic withdrawal of Czecho-Slovak troops from the Ukrainian front and their remarkable migration across Siberia. No tale of military achievement in this war is more astounding. The fine spirit and discipline of these men and their determination to cross to France and fight against the Central Powers have aroused general enthusiasm. To help them and their fellow countrymen who are scattered in groups from the Volga to Irkutsk is the unanimous consent of everyone who is susceptible to tales of valor. This emotional state of public opinion must be reckoned with. It is intense in this country and becomes more insistent for action and more impatient of delay as the details of the adventure are known.

With that feeling I am deeply impressed and would consider myself lacking in true sentiment if I was not stirred by the courage and temper of men who have overcome such obstacles and faced unflinchingly so many dangers

15. Woolsey to Lansing, August 23, 1918. Files of the Department of State.

16. The Lansing Diaries, August 23, 1918.

17. Masaryk, op. cit., p. 172. The American Consul General in London, Robert P. Skinner, sent in a copy of the British recognition, but it did not arrive in Washington till August 27

inspired by devotion to their national aspirations and by their intense hatred of Austrian mastery. It is, therefore, no easy matter to view the subject coldly and weigh fairly the reasons for and against recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as a nation.

There is no doubt that the full recognition of these people as an independent state entitled to the possession of the territories included within Bohemia, Slovakia and Moravia in the course which would be most politic and meet most fully the popular demand. It would undoubtedly give new courage to the Czechs and Slovaks in Russia, Siberia and even elsewhere, and would bind them still more closely to the common cause. It would be in harmony with the declarations of the Allied Governments and receive the unanimous approval of the American people. This is the easy way — the natural way.

In spite of these apparent advantages I feel, nevertheless, that it is necessary to go very slowly before we take a step which commits this Government to the recognition of an independent state based upon the principle that a people who have been oppressed and their native land held in subjection by superior force are entitled to be free and to possess the land.

Immediately upon so broad a declaration by this Government the Central Powers would raise the question—at least I would if I had the conduct of their affairs — why since we are so solicitous about oppressed nations, do we not take a definite stand for the independence of Ireland, Egypt, India and South Africa. It would be hard to deny that the question was justified, and even harder to explain the distinction between the suzerainty of an autocratic and of a democratic government. I hardly think that this explanation would be generally acceptable, and if it were not the consequences might be serious, particularly among the advocates of Irish independence in this country since it would invite the charge of inconsistency and prejudice. From the viewpoint of domestic politics it would be a very unwise policy.

In addition to this immediate result we would be, I think, embarrassed in no small degree at the peace table by having admitted beforehand the claims of the subject races of the Central Powers and of Turkey and by having ignored the claims of the Irish and others under the sovereignty of the Entente Powers.

I feel that we must so far as we can avoid committing ourselves to a policy or a principle which can not be uniformly applied when a readjustment of nationalities takes place as it undoubtedly will. In any event we must proceed now on the assumption that these subjects will be discussed and we must guard very carefully against taking a position which would affect our influence or limit our freedom of action.

The unqualified recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as an independent nation puts the British Government in an anomalous position in view of the nationalities subject to the British Crown. If I were an Austrian statesman, I would retaliate by recognizing the independence of Ireland, Egypt and India. It would be the natural measure of retaliation.

How the British delegates to the peace conference will explain this apparent inconsistency I do not know. The answer will by no means be easy. Great Britian has already an unenviable reputation for having one rule for herself and another rule for other nations. As a result she is charged with more or less reason with selfishness, injustice and lack of principle. We ought to

be very careful not to earn the same reputation. If we do, we will lose the high place of influence which we have among the nations.

I am, therefore, opposed to recognizing the national independence of the Czecho-Slovaks or to accept them as a sovereign state. The better and safer course seems to me to recognize their belligerency as they are prosecuting open war against Austria-Hungary and her Allies. If they succeed in their revolt and are associated with the United States and the Entente in a military victory, they will have established by force of arms their sovereign right to self rule and to independence.

I believe much the same policy should be followed in the case of Jugo-Slavs when they are able to maintain armed rebellion against Austria-Hungary. Until there is this open manifestation of independent power we should be extremely cautious of our policy in dealing with them.[18]

On August 25 Lansing re-drafted the public announcement of the recognition furnished him by Woolsey in the following manner:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Draft
August 25, 1918

Since the peoples of Bohemia and Slovakia have determined to assert by force of arms their independence of the Empire of Austria-Hungary which has by superior might held them in vassalage contrary to their will and deprived them of their civil and political liberties; and

Since these oppressed peoples have denounced their allegiance to Austria-Hungary and have declared their independence, and for their mutual interests have assembled armed forces to wage war upon the Empire of Austria-Hungary and its allies and have established the Czecho-Slovak National Council to direct the revolution against the Empire which seems to hold them to subjection; and

Since it cannot be doubted but that the revolutionary activities of the Czecho-Slovaks have assumed proportions sufficiently great to constitute a state of belligerency and to warrant the recognition of a state of civil war in that portion of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire now claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks as independent of imperial authority;

The Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary and the Czech and Slovak peoples seeking to establish their national independence, and gives recognition to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, of which Professor Thomas G. Masaryk is the president, as a *de facto* revolutionary Government; and furthermore declares that Council is entitled to exercise the functions, to enjoy the privileges and to discharge the obligations of a belligerent engaged with the Government of the United States and other associated Governments in the prosecution of the war now being waged against the Imperial Governments of Germany and Austro-Hungary.[19]

RL/RCS/*CC*

On the afternoon of August 30 Lansing had an opportunity to dis-

18. *The Lansing Papers* (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
19. Files of the Department of State.

cuss the recognition of the Council with Wilson, when the President called on him at the Department of State and spent an hour in conference with him.[20] On the same night, no doubt as a result of the President's suggestions, Lansing re-drafted the announcement again at home, possibly comparing it with the British recognition. In this draft, which follows, all reference to the geographical units of Bohemia and Slovakia is omitted. Instead, like the British recognition, it refers simply to the "Czecho-Slovaks:"

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Draft of Public Declaration
August 30, 1918

The Czecho Slovaks, having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and having placed organized armies in the field, are waging war against those Empires in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations and under officers of their own nationality.

The Czecho-Slovaks have, in the prosecution of their independent purposes, confided to the Czecho-Slovak National Council supreme political authority.

In view of these facts the Government of the United States recognizes —

That a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires; and

That the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the *de facto* government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against their common enemies, the Empire of Germany and the Empire of Austro-Hungary.[21]

On the following day, August 31, Masaryk sent over to the Department of State his memorandum on the recognition of the National Council requested of him by Lansing on August 23. It was a long document containing a brilliant polemic with all the arguments for maintaining Austria-Hungary and against Czechoslovak independence. Contrary to common assumption,[22] Masaryk did not base the claims of the Czechoslovaks to independence on the right of national self-determination but on Bohemia's historical rights: "We stand on the firm basis of our historical rights to complete independence." By implication Slovakia, too, was claimed on historical grounds: "Slovakia, the southern part of the nation, was occupied by the Magyars and separated very early from Bohemia

20. The Lansing Diaries, August 30, 1918.

21. Lansing to Wilson August 1, 1918, enclosure. Files of the Department of State.

22. Thus, for instance, the English student of Austrian history Professor A. J. P. Taylor, wrote: "Masaryk . . . won Wilson for the cause of national self-determination according to his own interpretation — an interpretation that transformed historic Bohemia into the national state of the Czechoslovaks." Taylor, *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1815-1918* (London, 1948), p. 246.

and Moravia; at times, even later, the Slovaks were independent." In retrospect, however, perhaps the most important feature of the memorandum was the discussion of the German minority in Bohemia and Moravia: "Finally, we may hear the argument that the German minorities in the new national states might be endangered. This is a strange interest in things that might happen and lack of interest in things that are! Whole nations are being oppressed by the Germans and Magyars--and that's nothing? The question of minorities is, of course, a serious one. the peace conference will, no doubt, be of the opinion that there should be as few national minorities as possible . . . As far as they do exist, however, the democratic rule of majority must be applied. Is it more just, for instance, that ten million Czechs and Slovaks be oppressed by Austria-Hungary than that the Germans in Bohemia and Slovakia, numbering only three millions, should have constitutionally guaranteed national freedom?"[23]

It appears, however, that Masaryk's memorandum was delivered too late to be studied by Lansing. It nevertheless retains historical importance as a summary of his oral arguments and for putting him on record, particularly as regards the question of the German minority which was to play such an important part in the dismemberment of Czechoslovkia twenty years later.[24] On the same day, August 31, the Secretary of State sent over to the White House his draft of the recognition of the Czechoslovaks, prepared on the night before. In the covering letter he made no reference to Masaryk's memorandum, but he tactfully reminded the President that it was politically expedient to publish the announcement as soon as possible. "I find there is a disposition among the newspaper men to discuss — possibly criticize — our silence in regard to this matter. I have been fortunate enough to be able to stop it thus far but to tell the truth it is getting out of hand. I hope therefore that we can do something very shortly."

Although, as late as May 1918, the existence of the Czechoslovaks

23. See text, Edvard Beneš, *Světová Válka a naše revoluce*, 3 vols. (Prague 1927-1928); III *Dokumenty*, No. 154.

24. Masaryk's memorandum refutes the accusation levelled against him by the Austrian historian Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau that he had sought to conceal the existence of the German minority in Bohemia from Wilson or deceive him about it. See, Glaise-Horstenau, *The Collapse of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire* (London-Toranto, 1920) p. 219. It invalidates also a similar reproach of Wilson's. When told of the large numbers of Germans in Bohemia on board the *George Washington* sailing to the peace conference, he is supposed to have exclaimed: "Why, Masaryk never told me that." See, Charles Seymour, *Geography, Justice and Politics at the Paris Conference of 1919* (New York, 1951), p. 9. Masaryk never told Wilson about the Germans in Bohemia because he never had an opportunity to, and it was no fau't of his that Lansing did not forward his memoranda to the President.

was known in the United States only to a few well-informed persons, now, as a result of the Siberian venture, the American public took a lively interest in them, and a strong pressure was exerted on the Government to satisfy their demands. To illustrate this state of opinion, Masaryk quotes from a letter of the Secretary of Interior, Franklin K. Lane: " . . . Isn't this a great world? And its biggest romance is not even the fact that Woodrow Wilson rules it, but the march of the Czechoslovaks across 5,000 miles of Russian Asia — an army on foreign soil, without government, without a span of territory, that is recognized as a nation. This, I think, appeals to my imagination as nothing else in the war has done since the days when King Albert of Belgium held out at Liege."[26] On August 23 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, a strong Republican critic of the Wilson Administration, made a long speech in the Senate on war aims and urged, among others, that "the great Slav populations now under the Government of Austria — the Jugo-Slavs and the Czecho-Slovaks, who have been used to aid the Germans, whom they loathe — must be established as independent States."[27] President Wilson was not one to bow readily to the demands of the opposition. But, since the Administration had already prepared to recognize the Czechoslovaks, there was no sense in letting the Republicans make political capital out of this popular issue by delaying a decision, particularly not in a year of Congressional elections.

On September 2 the President approved Lansing's draft of August 30, making in it only minor stylistic changes. Returning it to the Secretary of State, he observed that he thought that Lansing had "successfully stated both the actual facts and the new legal relationship which we assume."[28] No further changes were made in the declaration. At noon the following day, September 3, Lansing summoned Masaryk to his office, handed him an official copy of the recognition, and then released it to the press and wired it to American missions abroad.[29]

The conclusions that may be drawn from the foregoing documents are several: (1) The recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council was based neither on Bohemia's historical rights to independence nor on the principle of national self-determination, but on the fact of Czechoslovak belligerency. (2) The recognition committed the United States Govern-

26. *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane* (New York, 1922), p. 293, as quoted in Masaryk, op. cit. pp. 55-56 note.

27. *Congressional Record* 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 56:9 (August 23, 1918), p. 9393.

28. *The Lansing Papers* II, 144-145.

29. The Lansing Diaries, September 3, 1918; *Foreign Relations, 1918,* Suppl. 1; I; 824-825.

ment to uphold Czechoslovak independence from Austria-Hungary, and together with the recognitions accorded the Czechoslovaks by other Allied Governments, it virtually assured them a place as an Allied belligerent nation at the peace conference. But it in no sense implied a recognition of exact territorial claims.[30] (3) Since the Czechoslovaks — unlike the Cuban revolutionaries whose belligerency had been recognized by President Grant — were not in possession of the territory they claimed and thus lacked what had always been regarded as an essential element of sovereignty, and since the limits of this territory were at the time unkown to the American policy-makers, [31] Lansing though it wise to dissociate the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council from any conception of territory by following the British example of granting recognition to the *Czecho-Slovaks* — wherever they might be, in Siberia, France, or Italy — rather than to *Czechoslovakia*, a territorial unit then still of uncertain limits. (4) In preparing the recognition, State Department officials carefully studied it in the light of precedents. Lansing also gave careful thought to its possible effects on domestic American politics and on the current international situation. It does not appear, however, that any thought was given to its possible effect on post-war Europe. Neither President Wilson nor the State Department officials appear to have been concerned at the time with the important question of the disposal of the German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. Generally speaking, President Wilson and his foreign-policy advisors thought that all such detailed questions should be left to the peace conference to decide.[32] (5) Contrary to common belief, the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council, like previous anti-Austrian measures adopted by the United States Government, was not a result of direct, personal discussions between Wilson and Masaryk. The impetus to the adoption of this measure came from the American public, impressed

30. It may be interesting to note in this connection that at the Paris Peace Conference the American delegation advocated an ethnic boundary for Czechoslovakia until April 4, 1919, when during a period of the President's illness, Edward M. House gave in to the French demand for the retention of the historical boundary of Bohemia and Moravia.

31. On September 27, 1918, as an afterthought, the Department of State wired to London to inquire the views of the Foreign Office about the future boundaries of the Czechoslovak State. The British officials appear to have been equally uncertain about this question at the time, for the Foreign Office did not reply until November 13, 1918 and even then did not take a clear stand. See, *Foreign Relations, 1919. The Paris Peace Conference,* 13 vols. (Washington, 1942-1947), II, 376-377.

32. "[Peace] cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it . . . and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment . . ." Wilson's address. February 11, 1918, see Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.); *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace,* 2 vols. (New York, 1927), I, 180.

with the exploits of the Czechoslovak soldiers in Siberia. Besides the Siberian adventure, important elements of American public opinion were, no doubt, influenced by Masaryk's skillful propaganda. But the State Department officials, charged with the elaboration of the recognition, paid little heed to his suggestions, and President Wilson approved the declaration without discussing it with him.[33]

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33. Before the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council Wilson met Masaryk only once, on June 19, 1918, several weeks after he had first decided upon an anti-Austrian policy (see this author's article "The United States and the Dissolution of Austria-Hungary," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, X (October, 1950), pp. 256-270, and two months before he seriously considered recognition of the Czechoslovaks. The question was not broached in their correspondence.

REVIEW NOTE

A SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE SPD, 1895-1933

by Henry J. Tobias and John L. Snell

THE history of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) has attracted the attention of a large number of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years. Soviet scholarship recently added to the growing mass of factual information and interpretation in the work of Dr. Boris Aleksandrovich Chagin, professor of dialectical and historical materialism in the faculty of philosophy at Leningrad University and assistant editor of *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta.*[1]

Chagin's contribution must be reviewed with his frames of reference in mind. The post-war pattern of historical writing in the Soviet Union is well known. The historian must demonstrate inspiration by Marxist-Leninist theory; citation of Lenin's works is a practice (to which Chagin conforms) which helps to establish the propriety of one's proletarian approach: one must be free from an "excessive love for facts," and yet acutely conscious of detail which tends to substantiate the "theoretical generalizations" upon which contemporary Soviet policies are defended, and upon which they are asserted to be based; one must assume that the interests of the "proletariat" do not contradict but "coincide with the objective course of historical development"; the historian is expected to acknowledge the leading role of the Great Russians in the revolutionary new epoch of world history and to de-emphasize or deny the indebtedness of Soviet culture to the western world. Finally, the Soviet scholar should apply to the interpretation of other areas the "truths" about societal development that his knowledge of the growth of Russian Communism is expected to yield.[2]

Within this frame of reference, the Soviet historian with a sufficiently

[1] The authors are indebted to Fritz T. Epstein of the Library of Congress for having called to their attention the Soviet sources upon which this review is based: B. A. Chagin, "Ideologiia nemetskoi sotsial-demokratii v period 1895-1914 (K voprosu ob ideino-politicheskm zagnivanii nemetskoi sotsial-demokratii)," a summary of Chagin's doctoral thesis, "The Ideology of German Social Democracy in the Period 1895-1914 (on the Problem of the Rotting of Political Idealism of German Social Democracy)," *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta,* No. 6 (June, 1947), 135-142; B. A. Chagin, "K voprosu o mirovozzrenii nemetskoi sotsial-demokratii v period 1914-1933," an article entitled "On the Problem of the Ideology of German Social Democracy in the Period 1914-1933." *ibid.*, No. 3 (March, 1947), 113-131.

[2] Cf. Sergius Yakobson, "Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCLXIII (May, 1949), 127. This article presents a brief survey of the most important demands made upon the professional historian in the U. S. S. R. For additional information cf. Anatole G. Mazour

elastic ethic may approach the study of the SPD with considerable confidence. Lenin himself contributed to him a number of "theoretical generalizations" about the subject in his frequent denunciations of "economistic," "petty bourgeois," and nationalistic tendencies within German Social Democracy. Chagin is careful not to transcend the theoretical limitations thus imposed. The year 1895 is picked as a decisive turning point in the history of the SPD, and we are told that the death of Friederich Engels in that year was inevitably followed by the opportunistic "rotting" of the party. Chagin, true to Soviet nationalism as currently defined, censures even Engels for having failed to interpret correctly the international tendencies of the last years of his life since Engels' attacked Tsarist expansionism,[3] Chagin hardly would dare avoid concluding in 1947 that "Engels still did not see the new epoch, the new period of historical development."[4] The death of Engels removed the last effective check against "the process of opportunistic re-constitution" of the German socialist movement, according to Chagin. Henceforth, not the SPD, but "Russian revolutionary Social Democrats, with Lenin at their head, "assumed the task of propagating revolutionary proletarian theory, and continued Engels' "struggle against international opportunism." When German Social Democracy ignored Lenin's "experience of struggle with bourgeois liberalism and Revisionism,"[5] it was subverted by the latter.[6]

Chagin loyally though falsely asserts that "only the leaders of the Russian proletariat—Lenin and Stalin—gave general battle to international Revisionism";[7] in doing so, they "not only defended revolutionary Marxism, but even creatively developed it further."[8] Forced to acknowledge Karl Kautsky's well known opposition to Revisionism, Chagin, following Lenin, concentrates some of his most destructive adjectives against the German Marxist theorist. He concludes that the Kautsky-led center of the SPD moved rapidly between 1905 and 1914 toward the Revisionist viewpoint, and away from the extreme leftists within German Social Democracy. The logical culmination of this trend of the center was its "treachery" to the international proletarian movement in 1914.[9]

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and Herman E. Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," *Journal of Modern History*, XXIV (March, 1952), 56-68.

3 Arthur Rosenberg, *The Birth of the German Republic* (London, 1931), p. 69.

4 Chagin, "Ideologiia nemetskoĭ sotsial-demokratii v period 1895-1914," *loc. cit.*, p. 136.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 138.

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*, p .139.

Nowhere does Soviet nationalism appear so clearly in Chagin's work as in his discussion of the extreme leftists among the German socialists. While he modestly praises them for having been the only German Social Democrats who "came forward as the defenders of Marxist theory," he mistakenly credits Bolshevism for this saving grace. The "ripening of the revolutionary views of the left" and the strengthening of the leftist struggle against Revisionism followed the Russian Revolution of 1905 and was stimulated by the "influence of Bolshevism." Even after 1905 the German leftists made grievous errors, states Chagin. They opposed secession from the SPD, defending instead the "pernicious theory" that opportunism should be overcome by intra-party struggle. Furthermore, the German leftists, including Rose Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, under-estimated the importance of Marxist theory, and had an unfortunate admiration for the concept of "spontaneity," the belief that capitalism would eventually collapse automatically through the development of its own inner contradictions. While Chagin praises Franz Mehring, Anton Pannekoek, and Rosa Luxemburg for their criticism of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian idealism,[10] he criticizes reactionary role" of the Viennese physicist-philosopher, Ernst Mach.[11] In attacking the teachings of Mach, Chagin continues a practice established by Lenin in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and continued by Stalin in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*.

The German left-socialists are further rebuked for their lack of understanding of the "problem of violence"; the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat was "not understood by the left" before 1914, says Chagin, though he credits Mehring with having criticized Kautsky's views on the subject in 1918. Mehring, Clara Zetkin, and Karl Liebknecht are praised for their struggles against militarism in pre-war Germany, but again the praise is carefully measured; an "absence of understanding of imperialism" among the German left-socialists, says Chagin, caused their fight against chauvinist-militarism to be only "a weak dam, incapable of holding back its muddy torrent."[12] Thus, by 1914 the "decay of the party concerned all sections," not merely the Revisionists, nor even the centrists alone, but the left as well.[13] Thereby, the basis was laid for the complete victory of opportunism and Prussianism within the SPD, marking its transformation "into a national liberal party." Implicit throughout Chagin's

10 *Ibid.*, p. 142.
11 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
12 *Ibid.*, p. 141.
13 Chagin, "K voprosu o mirovozzrenii nemetskoi sotsial-demokratii v period 1914-1933," *loc. cit.*, p. 113.

treatment of the SPD before 1914 is his verdict that such a party was unfit to lead the international proletarian movement.

Chagin's discussion of the German socialist movement during the war of 1914 is misleading because it is based upon right-socialist sources. Thus the views of extreme right-socialists like Heinrich Cunow, Konrad Haenisch, Paul Lensch, and August Winning are well reviewed, but the attitudes of these persons are mistakenly presented as representative of the whole range of German socialist opinion. Hence Chagin reaches the conclusion that not only the rightists, but "the revolutionary Social Democrats in the war period betrayed Marxism."[14] Kautsky, the Independent Socialist, who in 1917 appealed for "restoration of the International for common battle against the war parties of all countries,"[15] is presented as one who argued against the possibility of resistance against imperialism.[16] Chagin cites no Independent Social Democratic newspaper and only one Independent Socialist periodical; most of them would have challenged his interpretations. He concludes that the war marked the abandonment of Marxism by the SPD (which is largely true) and that it also signified acceptance of the SPD of "bourgeois-Junker ideology" (which is largely untrue).[17]

Chagin asserts that SPD centrists, such as Kautsky and Rudolf Hilferding, were led to the wartime conclusion that Germany was unripe for revolution because they adhered to objectivism in their interpretations of German social history.[18] He laboriously tries to show that this "bourgeois objectivism" led them to desert Marxist materialism in favor of idealistic philosophy, and hence to carry out a "renaissance of Lassalleanism" during the 1920's. (Lassalleanism is presented as "the Social Democratic variant of Fichteanism and Hegelianism."[19]) For his part in carrying out this supposed transformation Kautsky is described as a "hypocritical and sugary opportunist."[20] Chagin is especially vigorous in his condemnation

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[15] Leipzig *Volkszeitung*, January 15, 1917

[16] Chagin, "K voprosu o mirovozzrenii . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p, 114,

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 121. One is further surprised to learn that Kautsky participated in the publication of a "collection of falsified documents on the origin of the 1914 war," in which he "tried his best to 'prove' the 'innocence' of German imperialism." *Ibid.*, p. 129. Chagin refers to Germany, Auswärtiges Amt (Karl Kautsky, Max Montgelas, and Walter Schücking, eds.), *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch* (Berlin ,1927), in which Kautsky tried to do no such thing. Chagin ignores Kautsky's *Wie der Weltkrieg entstand* (Berlin, 1919), the thesis of which is stated in the title of the English translation: *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern* (London, 1920).

of Max Adler, the noted Austrian socialist-sociologist, who is most often cited to prove the prevalence of neo-Hegelian concepts among German socialists, but frequently refers to more obscure theorists like Heinrich Levy, H. Marcuse, A. Krenold, and S. Mark. It is doubtful if more than a few dozen intellectuals in the entire German socialist movement were acquainted with the writings of these neo-idealists; still fewer were influenced by them. One looks in vain in the memoirs of prominent Weimar Social Democratic practitioners like Philipp Scheidermann, Otto Braun, Carl Severing, Friedrich Stampfer, Gustav Noske, Curt Geyer, and Wilhelm Keil for any evidence of the influence of these men.

Chagin regards the idealistic renaissance as the means whereby the Social Democrats interpreted the dialectic to mean the evolutionary competition and reconciliation of interests (and especially of ideas) without force and violence, thus departing from the Marxist-Leninist translation of dialectic to mean the revolutionary clash of materialistic class interests.[21] Chagin says the SPD ideologists, having found the revolutionary spirit intolerable, turned to idealism because in it they found philosophical justification for belief in "continuity and gradualness of development." Influenced by it, they considered the notion of a sudden leap forward in social progress as "a mystical idea with which so-called [Chagin] science was in direct contradiction."[22] Through the revival of idealistic thought, the "reactionary leaders of Social Democracy" sought to check the growing revolutionary spirit of the workers.[23] Furthermore, says Chagin, revealing the probable cause of his exaggerated concern about the idealistic revival, they used it as a theoretical weapon against the German Communist Party.[24] Thereby, says Chagin, the German workers were ideologically disarmed by the SPD. Result: by 1933 "the poison of Prussian chauvinism oozed out of all the pores of the ideology of German Social Democracy."[25] Chagin repeatedly emphasizes his thesis that neo-Hegelian thought, propagated by the SPD, "paved the way for the ideology of fascism."[26]

By western standards of scholarship, what does Chagin contribute to the history of German socialism? Much of the factual material which he presents is accurate in whole or in part, though not new. It is generally recognized even by prominent contemporary Social Democrats themselves that Marxist theory was of little practical significance in the SPD on the eve of World War I; the Kautsky-led center indeed moved toward Revis-

21 Chagin, "K voprosu o mirovozzrenii . . . ," *loc. cit.*, pp. 126-127.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 129.
23 *Ibid.*, p. 123.
24 *Ibid.*, p. 126.
25 *Ibid.*, p. 131. 26 *Ibid.*, p. 123; 131.

ionism during the decade preceding 1914, as Chagin states, and the Liebknecht-Luxemburg leftists on the eve of the war did indeed constitute "a weak dam" against imperialism. More original contributions were made, however, in the discussions of the wartime social-chauvinists and of the neo-Hegelian ideologists of the Weimar period. Though the former have been discussed in English,[27] the present writers know of no other account which so fully demonstrates the intimate relationship between the right-wing socialist theorists and the idealist philosophy through which they rationalized their approval of German imperialism. Futhermore, it is quite probable that SPD state-socialist ideologists did indeed contribute, though unknowingly, to the creation of a climate of economic opinion which favored the growth of Nazism, 1919-1933. But the present authors favor a far more complex interpretation of the decline in influence of the SPD, and of the causes of Nazism in Germany than the one which Chagin suggests.

Chagin's doctoral thesis on the SPD, 1895-1914, won for him Leningrad University's highest prize for scholarship in 1946 (with an accompanying stipend of 25,000 rubles).[28] His contribution to Soviet scholarship and that of Soviet scholarship to him are, therefore, undeniable. But in the final analysis his chief contribution to Western scholars is to warn them of the fate of the historian under Communism. To Chagin as to other Soviet historians, the proper function of the scholar is to give intellectual support to the policies of the leaders of the state, or, in ideological language, of the "proletariat." Chagrin excorates the approach to history which holds that "there is in reality neither justice nor injustice, no value judgment, but only understanding which flows out of the relation of reason and action." Chagin rejects this "bourgeois objectivism" because it leaves no room for "a proletarian, party analysis."[29] Karl Kautsky gave the rebuttal for western scholarship a full generation ago when he asserted that Bolshevik historical writing represented matters to serve its purposes, not hesitating to warp the picture "when falsification meets its requirements."[30] Chagin's studies on the SPD document the continued applicability of Kautsky's criticisms, and reveal once again the gaping chasm that separates German socialists from Russian Communists in the present international environment.

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27 Cf. Lenore O'Boyle, "Theories of Socialist Imperialism," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (1950), 290-298.

28 *Vestnik Leningradskogo Universiteta*, No. 3 (March, 1947), 172-173.

29 Chagin, "K voprosu o mirovozzrenii . . . ," p. 116,

30 Karl Kautsky, *Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Sozialdemokraite* (Berlin, 1921), p. 4.

NOTES

Although intended for the general public and not a scholarly organ, the quarterly *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,* published by the German-Ukrainian Society in cooperation with the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (Verlag Ukraine, Rumfordstrasse 41, München 5, U.S. Zone, Germany), has published in its first year of existence (1952) several articles of interest to the historian.

Westernization in the Ukraine is well summarized, but somewhat overemphasized by J. Mirtschuk (No. 1). The tragedy of the Uniats under Soviet rule is described on the basis of pastoral letters, missives, and memoranda of the Galician Metropolitan, Count Andreas Sheptyckyj, who died on November 1, 1944 (Nos. 1 and 2); his courageous protests against the incorporation of Galicia into the Government General and against the persecution of the Jews are duly stressed. G. Prokoptschuk describes Cardinal Faulhaber's efforts for a reunion of the churches by founding the St. Andreas-Kolleg which existed in Munich between 1932 and 1939 (No. 3). H. Corso's article about the history of the Ukrainian economy, which presents some useful statistics, does not go beyond 1935 (No. 1); much more up-to-date is the statistical material in an article by G. von Studynskyj on the economic strength of the Ukraine (No. 3).

Paul Rohrbach, with Axel Schmidt a steadfast champion since the First World War of a German pro-Ukrainian policy, has contributed three articles: the first, a note explaining how he became a professional Ukrainophile (No. 2); the second, a survey article on the Ukrainian Question (No. 3); and finally, in commemoration of his friend Axel Schmidt, an article which contains important information about the Russian desk at the *Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst* in the First World War and on Germany's Ukrainian policy in 1918 (No. 4).

FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

The first five numbers (at least that is what I think it is, the bibliographical techniques are rather vague) of *Les Cahiers de Bruges,* a quarterly issued by the Collège d'Europe, 16 Dyver, Bruges, Belgium, has come to the editor's desk. As an organ of the College of Europe its aim is to provide an outlet for the intellectual activity of humanistically trained scholars from the captive countries, and at the same time to serve as a medium of interpretation of recent events in Europe by those who are disturbed by the present fragmentation of a culture. Some of the articles are in French, about an equal number in English. The level of thought and writing is generally high, the compass of interest is broad. A few titles of articles will indicate the breadth of interest. Ladislas Cerych: "Géographie humaine et politique des massifs du pourtour bohémien"; Jean Noiret, "L'héritage celtique en Europe"; K. P. Zimmer, "Les griefs de la Pologne"; John Bowle, "The Western political traditions in a scientific world"; C. W. Squire, "The Soviet attack on Imperialism—A Study in Political Warfare"; H. Brugmans, "Deux témoignages sincères sur l'empire soviétique,"

etc. The notes on activities at the College would indicate that intellectual life among the faculty and students is active, sane and reasonably hopeful.

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The first number of the new *Československý casopis historický* dated 1953 has appeared. The old and highly respected *Český časopis historický* had begun to appear in 1896 under the editorship of Jaroslav Gall, and continued, with no interruption until the last war, to resume a somewhat precarious publication in 1946. Its last number for its fiftieth year (1947-49), appeared in 1949. Since then the projected reorganization of the Czech Academy along lines of the Soviet *Akademija Nauk*, has proceeded according to schedule. The present journal is published by the revamped *Československá akademie věd*. The editor in chief is František Graus, and the editorial board consists of Ludovit Holotik, Arnošt Klima, Jurij Křížek, Josef Polišenský, Bedřich Šindelář, Jindřich Veselý, Marcel Zachoval, and Bohumil Černý is acting as editorial secretary. The tone of the first number is strongly marxist, in line with the declaration of policy, "For a marxist historical science," which appears as the editorial. An interesting review article by Jan Pachta "Dokumenty o protilidové a protonárodní politice T. G. Masaryka" argues that Thomas Masaryk arranged for the independence of Czechoslovakia to deceive and victimize the Czech and Slovak people. There are other equally interesting items in this new publication.

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It is a pleasure to give publicity to a recent acquisition by the Indiana University Library. A collection, consisting of over 1,200 items, of most of the German-language publications concerning the Baltic lands, assembled by a German Balt over the past thirty years, was, by some good fortune, gotten to Holland and thence acquired by the Indiana University Libraries. A number of extremely rare complete runs of periodicals, such as the Riga *Baltische Monatschrift* (1859-1939) and the *Baltische Waidmannsblätter* (Riga, 1901-1914) appear to be unique holdings in America, and it is probable that as a working collection it is not matched in any known library in this country.

* * *

There is to be a Conference of American and Canadian Slavicists at Ann Arbor, June 27-29, 1953, under the joint sponsorship of the University of California, Columbia and Harvard Universities and the University of Michigan. The aim is to provide specialists in Slavic literatures, folklores and linguistics a chance to compare notes and exchange ideas. There will be three sessions on literature, two on linguistics, and one on folklore, and two open sessions on the present status of Slavic research in America and Europe. Two distinguished visitors will add to the attractiveness of the conference: Professors Christian Stang of Oslo, and Dmitri Stremooukhoff of Lille. Those interested should communicate with Professor James Ferrell, 2209 Angell Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

* * *

The following communication from Dr. Paul R. Sweet, Chief of the Ger-

man War Documents Project of the Department of State, is of interest to the profession:

The Department of State has deposited in the National Archives a collection of over 75,000 frames of microfilm of documents from the archives of the former German Foreign Ministry. This consists of material on the Peace Conference of 1919 as well as of documentation on World War I additional to that already sent to the National Archives in 1951.

Furthermore, a collection of over 50,000 frames of microfilm of the papers of Gustav Stresemann, covering the period down to his death in 1929, has also been delivered to the National archives.

BOOK REVIEWS

VASILIEV, A .A., *History of the Byzantine Empire. 324-1453.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1952. Pp. 846. $10.00.

This volume represents the comprehensive results of a long and profitable lifetime spent in investigating the history of the Byzantine empire. Professor Vasiliev's scholarly production itself extends back over a period of some sixty years, to publication in 1894 of an article on the problem of Justinian's Slavic origin in *Vizantiysky Vremennik.* The Russian edition of the present work appeared in two volumes between 1917-1925, and was subsequently translated into English. French, Turkish, and Spanish translations have also appeared, the latter having been published in 1948. Having now at his disposal the discoveries and re-interpretations of Byzantine scholars during the past thirty-five years, Professor Vasiliev has presented us with a second revised English edition of his *History.*

The book is well balanced in content, and includes maps, genealogical tables and a lengthy bibliography (65 pages). A close comparison of the first English edition with the present one shows that the author has kept intact the vast majority of his former subject matter. But many parts have been re-worked in order to incorporate the latest periodical and monographic literature on the history of Byzantium. One instance is the inclusion (p. 124) of Norman Baynes' claims that the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* was written during the reign of Julian the Apostate. There is also a bit of new material on Ammianus Marcellinus (p. 125), the Nika Revolt (p. 156), the Basilics and the *Tipucitus* (p. 343). An excellent final example of the use of the new material is the contemporary observation (p. 654 f.) of the Polish historian, Jan Dlugosz, on the fall of Constantinople, which was edited and published by Halecki in *Byzantion,* VII (1932). Many sentences and paragraphs have been completely rephrased, and the paragraph structure, which was notoriously choppy in the first edition, is much better proportioned.

An entirely new part of the *History* is the section on Byzantine feudalism, which is taken from two of the author's previous publications. He is the first to admit that this particular subject has hardly been touched, and we must await with anticipation further studies on the system of land-holding and military service in the Eastern empire. If, as the author asserts, the Byzantine *pronoia* is akin to the western European *feodum,* then he appears to be quite correct in also relating it to the *pomestye* of the Vladimir-Suzdal region in medieval Russia.

Although Professor Vasiliev discusses the social and economic history of Byzantium, we should like to know infinitely more about the 'common man' in the Eastern empire; his social, economic and legal condition. There are rather fine passages on the relations of Bohemund of Tarentum with Alexius Comnenus (pp. 409 ff.). Also noteworthy are the delightful sections on learning, literature and art at the end of each chapter. It is quite refreshing, for example, to

see the notice of the frescoes of Santa Maria Antica in connection with Byzantine art of the seventh-eighth centuries. For those fragments at the foot of the Palatine in the Forum are seldom if ever mentioned outside of art history manuals.

The work contains a few unusual geographical reference words such as "Pyrenean peninsula" (p. 137), which derive from Russian usage. And should we have to be told, in a work of this nature, that the Lombards "soon conquered northern Italy, which became known as Lombardy" (p. 172). However, these are rather insignificant matters, and scarcely detract from the immense value of the volume. It should be warmly received by the world of scholars who are interested in that other Rome and its life and fortunes over the course of a thousand years.

University of Colorado FRANK PEGUES

TROUTON, RUTH, *Peasant Renaissance in Yugoslavia 1900-1950.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. Pp. 344. 28s.

The purpose of this study was "to consider the conditions which arise when a peasant society . . . comes into contact with modern society . . . and the part education . . . plays in the changes which then take place in the peasant society" (p. 1). Following these objectives the author makes a distinction between the "pure type" and "mixed type" of Yugoslav peasant soicety, then discusses the Yugoslav non-peasant society and various types of market towns and their influence on the peasant society. There is also an analysis of the formal education of the peasants together with a discussion of the effect of formal education on peasant family, on village society and on the genesis of new social classes. Then follows an account of the development of urban-rural conflict, the rise of peasant movements in the inter-war period, and the consequent changes in the peasant society and in the peasant education. In the last chapter there is a discussion of the Yugloslav Communist revolution, the "character, aims and policy of the new rulers" and the effects of these policies on peasant society and on peasant education.

Developmental and structural method of analysis which the author employs is sociologically sound and as a rule brings satisfactory results. In the case of this study, however, its shortcomings stem from the reliance on secondary sources in the historical part and from lack of direct field observation in the last part of the book which deals with the contemporary Yugoslav society. It is to the credit of the author that in the historical part, while relying on secondary sources, an effort is made to remain detached and objective, particularly when dealing with the historical development and structural differences in the eastern and the western parts of the country, in spite of some errors, such as the lack of knowledge concerning the degree of political, economic and cultural autonomy which Croatia enjoyed in Austria-Hungary.

The same detachment and objectivity is not found in the last part of the book. In this part of the study the author heavily relies on printed sources, primarily newspapers and other periodicals, in the period between 1945 and 1947 and tends to take these sources at their face value without anattempt to evaluate them in terms of the Communist control of the press and its propaganda ob-

jectives. For this reason plans and programs and myths are often confused with accomplishments. One way to correct such a use of documentary sources in Communist society might be in checking them against self-criticism articles which has not been done in this study. Another way might be by direct field observation, but it is generally recognized that such field studies can seldom be carried on in a Communist society without government interference and "planting" of data. The years between 1945 and 1947 were the years of revolutionary enthusiasm and great optimism among the Yugoslav Communists. Since then there was the break with the Cominform, weakening of revolutionary fervor in Party ranks, purges, resistance of the peasantry to collectivization, famines, and increasing reliance on Western capitalism for help. That the author finally became aware of differences between myth and reality in Communist society is seen in the Conclusion in which some negative aspects of the policies of the present Communist regime regarding peasant education in Yugoslavia are pointed out.

Indiana University —DINKO TOMASIC

THOMAS, R. HINTON, *Liberalism, Nationalism and The German Intellectuals, 1822-1847*. Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1951 Pp. 48. 12s, 6d.

In a short essay published in 1922, Friedrich Meinecke wrote that "the political views and activities of German scholars form a peculiar historical pattern" and that "their basis, origin and development deserve a careful assessment." Stimulated by this remark, R. Hinton Thomas, Lecturer in German at the University of Birmingham, has produced a highly valuable study of the academic and scientific conferences of the period from 1822 to 1847. Utilizing primary sources at Göttingen University of the official proceedings of the meetings, Mr. Thomas, for the first time, has given us a systematic analysis of these conferences in the wider context of events and trends culminating in 1848. His special interest is dealing with the character and interplay of liberalism and nationalism in the German middle class as represented by its intellectuals.

With commendable insight and scholarly detachment, Mr. Thomas describes and evaluates the frustrating liberal-national dichotomy among German intellectuals of the period. Forced to function in a hostile climate, the scholars had to use the greatest circumspection in planning their meetings and had to proceed with moderation and caution. When the Scientists and Doctors met in Berlin in 1828, it was only as a result of Alexander von Humboldt's pleading that members were released on arrival from registration with the police; in return, Humboldt undertook to send daily lists of arrivals to officials. At the Conference of Classical Philologists, Secondary Schoolmasters and Orientalists held at Nuremberg in 1838, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior held its organizer, Friedrich Thiersch, personally responsible for keeping the discussions away from politics. The meetings were innocuous in character. Indeed, many, if not most, of the activities which Mr. Thomas describes were primarily scholarly discussions such as one hears today at the annual meeting of American historians and economists.

Although Mr. Thomas points out that "the national character of the con-

ferences was repeatedly emphasized," his work reveals that German intellectuals remained fundamentally weak and uninspired in stirring days. Public interest in revolutionary activity had been encouraged by the July Revolution in France, the insurrection in Belgium, and the Polish rising, but the scholars, for the most part, were too limited in their political horizon, too much the victims of the parochialism of the small-state system and Germany's social, economic and political backwardness, to play a vital role in the gradually quickening struggle between liberal and integral nationalism. They were often inconsistent in their thinking. "Consistency," writes Mr. Thomas, "was hardly a virtue to be attributed to intellectuals whose concern for freedom was qualified by their anxiety to maintain cordial relations with a quasi-feudal state determined to make the smallest possible concessions to parliamentary democracy." In the *Macht-Kultur* dualism, intellectuals were forced probably against their will to the power side of the dualism mostly because of their fear of the princes on the one hand and their dread of violent explosions on the left. The weakness and hesitancy of these intellectuals was demonstrated at the Frankfurt Assembly, which German nationalists have dismissed since then as a *"Professoren Parlament."* Some intellectuals left in disgust; others reversed their beliefs and "welcomed very strong action in the direction of the power-political interests (*Machtinteressen*) of Prussia." As Mr. Thomas shows, by this time German liberalism had compromised the best of its earlier aspirations, and many Germany intellectuals now found it convenient to refer to the uprising in 1848 superciliously and apologetically as "the crazy year" (*das tolle Jahr*).

Mr. Thomas reveals that at least one German intellectual, who had played a leading part in the pre-1848 developments, quickly uncovered his own illusions. George Gottfried Gervinus, the historian, left the Frankfurt Assembly during 1948, gave up the editorship of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, and wrote to Rudolf Haym in 1850; "I am convinced that we must set up the flag of the Republic . . . It was always a great problem for me whether a nation, which has become spiritually and sensuously so lacking in guts (*eine so geistig und sinnlich verweichlichte Nation*), really possessed the capacity for politics at all." To this, his fellow historian, Leopold von Ranke, whose studied aim was "free and objective scholarship," countered by condemning Gervinus's "fantasies" and "political partisanship," and then went on to glorify the achievements of Bismark's power-politics.

In essence, Mr. Thomas's penetrating study offers further proof of the little less than tragic fact that German "liberalism," for the most part, was not liberalism in the Western sense at all. It was so cramped by fear of the authorities, so subservient to the princes, so engrossed in theory and appalled by the necessity for action, that it was never able to bring itself to match the confidence and wider vision of English liberalism, in particular, and Western liberalism, in general.

The City College of New York LOUIS L. SNYDER

DRAHOMANOV, MYKHAYLO, *A symposium and selected writings.* New York: "Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.," 1952. Pp. 225.

The above symposium was compiled by members of the Drahomanov Commission of the Ukrainian Academy with Messrs. I. L. Rudnytskv, M. Stakhiv, P. Odarchenko, D. Doroschenko, V. Doroschenko participating, and under the invaluable chairmanship of Professor S. Drahomanov—devoted adherent of the ideas of his late father, Mykhaylo Drahomanov. Drahomanov's writings which form about a third of the book were thoughtfully selected and present the Ukrainian scholar in his full stature of historian, political theorist, folklorist. and even demographer. Professor P. E. Mosely's inspiring paper delivered at the 110th anniversary of Drahomanov's birth, comprises the first chapter of the volume and introduces the scholar and Ukrainian patriot as one, "who in his tireless activity resembled a Masaryk 'born out of season'."

Who was Drahomanov and why do studies concerning his life and teachings continue with unabated fervor up to now? Mykhaylo Drahomanov, 1841-1895, was born and raised in the region of Poltava amidst enlightened Ukrainian provincial gentry. The freedom of Cossack Ukraine was still remembered by that class as cherished although slightly dimmed ancestral history; it was only about 200 years since the representatives of the Cossack state entered into a Union with Moscow, and barely 75 years since Ukraine lost its autonomy and democratic institutions.

After graduating from the University of Kiev in world history, Drahomanov lectured at that institution from 1864. Delayed by the rampant reaction reigning in the Russian Empire following the Polish insurrection, he studied abroad during 1870-1873. In 1874, not without obstruction from certain members of the faculty, Drahomanov was appointed Professor of Roman History in Kiev. Two years later he was dismissed as a "dangerous liberal and Ukrainian separatist". From then on Drahomanov lived in exile in Geneva, Switzerland, until 1889, and Sofia, Bulgaria, until his death.

Drahomanov's career began after a short renaissance of Ukrainian culture ignited particularly by the genius of Shevshenko's melodious, nationally conscious poems, and supported by the writings of Kostomarov and Kulish. Drahomanov's first trip abroad meant much more to the young scholar than the possibility of amassing historic facts from German, French and Italian sources. He studied political and social institutions of Western Europe, and had the opportunity to meet Ukrainain patriots in Vienna and Praha. As a result of all that land of what he saw—how Ukrainians lived under the Austrian Empire in Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine, and in his native Ukraine he felt that "the situation demanded empiriously that some one say certain things aloud at the right time." Because of this call Drahomanov forsook the tranquility of a neutral academician, and chose Ukrainian as the language of his major writings, instead of the accepted, advantageous Russian. It was a time when all publications appearing in Ukrainian were soon to be forbidden, as happened according to the Tsarist ministerial decree of 1876.

But Drahomanov was aleady deeply engaged in studes of Ukrainian history, folklore and historic songs, and no imperial threats were to stop his endeavors. He made valuable contributions in these fields, especially remarkable because Drahomanov's original interests in these subjects was activated by the desire to revive among his compatriots the waning Ukrainian tradition, and the appreciation of what Ukraine could have been, and what it became.

Western Ukraine under the Austrian government offered certain possibilities for educational work and for civic activities among Ukrainians. As a matter of fact after the abolition of serfdom in the Austrian Empire, a modicum of parliamentary life was opened also for Ukrainians in Galicia, at that time a part of Austria-Hungary. In that very year, 1848, the Ukrainians in Galicia announced through their representative body ("The Ruthenian National Council") that they considered themselves a separate nationality. On the other hand, the Dnieper Ukrainians under the Russian government had to wait for literature to be smuggled to them over the Galician border, and to be secretly distributed among the devout.

The marvelous thing about Drahomanov's life is that despite every imaginable obstacle he left a legacy of practical achievements as well as a store of scholarly publications, the themes of which are as timely now as they were in his day.

Drahomanov contributed probably more than any other single person to the 1) development of political consciousness among Ukrainians; 2) the idea of Ukraine's independence; 3) the concept of federalism, its ways and means for a free people. There is hardly a phase of Ukrainian life that was not or is not influenced by the great Ukrainian patriot. Franko, West Ukrainian poet, educator, political organizer, was his admiring pupil; the dramatist and poetess, Lessya Ukrainka, niece of Mykhaylo Drahomanov, was practically brought up by her uncle. Ukrainian political parties, both democratic and social democratic, separatist or federalist, all developed under the stimulation of Drahomanov's thoughts as well as under the influence of the programs he proposed.

Drahomanov was above all a liberal (not traditional liberal), a humanitarian, a federalist and a firm believer in the democratic form of goverment. Why did the federalist Drahomanov find it inopportune to join the Russian political groups which fought Tsarism? Drahomanov must have pondered whether his activities could not be more potent if he were a member of a larger organized political unit. The explanation of his refusal to join the Russians is due to the fact that even the most advanced among them not only rejected any idea of granting political independence to Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic States, etc., but even speaking about federation meant its organization "from above." In other words, even enlightened Russians understood the process of federation as a kind of a gift by the dominating nationality to the other national groups, not a treaty among free and equal national groups.

Finally about Drahomanov's federalism and pan-slavism, topics of major interest today and of special interest to readers of the *Journal*." Drahomanov's pan-slavism was entirely different from the sentimental ideas of reciprocal

friendship and support among the Slavs as debated by the participants of the Slav Congress in Praha in 1848, and the following decades; it was entirely different from the official Russian pan-slavism where non Russian Slavs were regarded as strayed children who ought to be guided to return to the Motherland Russia, but only as minors, not as equals. To Drahomanov's mind a federation was possible and desirable only on the basis of absolute equality of the contracting parties. However, under the existing conditions such a federation was not feasible.

College Park, Maryland LUBOW A. MARGOLENA

SETON-WATSON, HUGH. *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. Pp. xvi, 406, $7.50.

The "Decline of Imperial Russia" deals with the political development of Russia from the end of the Crimean War until the First World War. The chief merit of the book is the fairness with which the international situation leading to the breakdown of autocracy in Russia is described. The complications, cross currents, and triangular struggles, which reflect a true human and political situation, are well understood and soberly presented. The chief weakness of the book lies in its practical purpose. As a text book, which it resembles owing to its collection of items for information, it is too narrow in scope and too detailed; as a monograph, it brings no specific new information nor enough integration and interpretation. Considerable and much appreciated attention is given to the role of the various nationalities in Russia and their special political movements. But unnecessary details, names, and statistics—not complete enough for systematic use by the scholar and too intricate for the needs of the ordinary student—bear witness to a certain lack of balance and tend to burden a book of such size and general organization.

Happily the author has not left out as many of the economic and ideological factors and of the descriptions of personalities as he himself suggests in his introductory remarks. Yet, what he brings, in this respect, is rather sketchy. His judgments of Alexander III, whose support of progressive economic policies is underestimated, and of Pobiedonostsev, whose honest though peculiar pessismistic world view cannot be separated from his political measures, repeat the generalizations of earlier historians and fail to communicate a feeling for the period described. Lenin's role and influence hardly appear in historical light; and to speak of Molotov in no other terms than of a man "who later achieved some notoriety" (p. 127) does not seem quite adequate. Stolypin's role is supported by evidence relating to social developments after 1905, although the presentation of the man as an outright reactionary may be challenged. But perhaps an underlying weakness—not sufficiently explained by the author's regretful statement that he could never personally visit Russia—consists in the British point of view which saw in parliamentarism of the English brand the best cure for Russia's pre-war autocratic ills (cf. p. 48).

The two chapters entitled "Background" and "Epilogue" are the weakest

Being ill-balanced, they convey no general picture to the reader; indeed to reduce modern Russia's origins to Peter the Great does justice neither to Peter's work nor to that of an Ivan IV, Boris Godunov, or Alexis Mikhailovich.

The advantages of the book remain thus confined to a review of an important era. Out of complex international conditions and out of Russia's internal practices which—despite vigorous reformatory and revolutionary forces—repressed needed change, a political situation arose that wrecked the imperial state of Russia and challenged all western civilization. It is the treatment of this aspect and the fairness with which it is presented that make Professor Seton Watson's book a compendium useful in stimulating the study of significant forces in modern history.

University of Delaware WALTER KIRCHNER

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD *and* FRANK T. ASHTON-GWATKIN, edd., *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946. The World in March 1939.* London: Oxford University Press, 1952. Pp. 546.

In all respects this study continues the high standards of the Surveys which have appeared for the years 1920-1938 under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is the first of about a dozen volumes covering the period 1939-1946 which are intended as a link between the pre-World War Surveys and a renewed annual series continuing the record from 1947 onwards. Professor Toynbee contributes chapters on the Western Hemisphere, the British Commonwealth, China, and Japan; H. V. Hodson on India and Ceylon; F. S. V. Donnison on Burma; Victor Purcell on South-East Asia; Edward Crankshaw on the Soviet Union; George E. Kirk on the Middle East; Katherine Duff on Italy; D. R. Gillie on France; and Martin Wight on Spain and Portugal, Switzerland, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, Germany, and a concluding chapter on the Balance of Power. H. C. Hillmann has written a 150 page chapter on the Comparative Strength of the Great Powers which is largely devoted to economic questions.

The chapters are designed to survey the world situation as it existed when Hitler ended Czechoslovak independence. To do this the authors drop back in history to varying dates, although in most cases they summarize events in the inter-war period. The volume is not remarkable for presenting new material, but is a masterpiece of condensation with interesting interpretations and judgments. European historians not too versed in Asiatic affairs will find these chapters a convenient place to be briefed on this important sphere of world politics. Scattered here and there, often in the voluminous and exceedingly valuable footnotes, are summaries of essential information which it would take many an hour to locate item by item or country by country. Here might be listed for illustration the thumb-nail sketches of the growth of the French Empire (pp. 178-9), the history of the various countries and provinces of Eastern Europe (pp. 208-9), the summary of parliamentary governments and dictatorships in these states (223-4), statistics on minorities (p. 230), the dates of the establishment of autonomous governments within Czechoslovakia after the Munich Crisis (p. 280)

or the exact dates of the various treaty engagements between the Anti-Comintern Powers, including the signatures by the lesser powers that adhered to these agreements (p. 512).

The chapters by Martin Wight, which will be of most interest to readers of the *Journal*, are among the best in the book. He has made good use of the material presented in evidence at the Trial of the Major War Criminals at Nürnberg, 1945-1946, as well as other document collections, memoirs, and studies. A few minor criticisms may be noted. In writing about the *Anschluss* of 1938, to state that "Hitler had not always intended to conquer Austria before Czechoslovakia; five months earlier he had declared the necessity of conquering them simultaneously . . ." (p. 268) hardly does credit to Hitler's admitted policy of piecemeal conquests. The policy of simultaneous conquests was definitely contingent on the event of Germany's being embroiled in war when he counted quite rightly on the certain hostility of Czechoslovakia. Nor is the statement that the Third Reich " . . . finally erased the ancient Länder of the Reich as the French Revolution erased the ancient provinces of the French Monarchy" a true evaluation of the actual accomplishments of Hitler's administrative changes. Wight speaks of President Hácha being summoned to Berlin on March 14, while Interpreter Paul Schmidt (*Statist auf Diplomatischer Bühne*, p. 429) and the recently published German Documents (Series D, Vol. IV, pp. 249, 255, 265-6) indicate that Hácha asked for the interview in a desperate last minute attempt to head off the catastrophe which was about to befall his country.

Hillman's chapter is filled with import, export, and industrial production data. This part of the book becomes rather technical in places and professional economists will feel more at home here than historians. In considering the causes for the relative shift in total production and total trade of various countries more attention could have been paid to the shift of new industries and modernization of equipment, things which some states neglected because of their established leadership. But here again a tremendous amount of useful material has been brought together.

The five maps are not particularly distinguished and the volume deserves better treatment in this respect both by the editors and the publishers.

Bowdoin College E. C. HELMREICH

GREINER, HELMUTH, *Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung. 1939-1943*. Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag. 1951. Pp. 444. Six maps, 24,50 DM.

This, to my knowledge, is the first book on an important aspect of World War II which is written by a German historiographer of military affairs. For twenty years, Helmuth Greiner assisted in writing the official history of World War I as a member of the Historical Division of the *Reichsarchiv* and the *Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres*. In August, 1939, he was transferred to the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* and appointed to keep its *Kriegstagebuch*. He held this post until the spring of 1943.

Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung is based only in part on this *Kriegstage-*

buch because, in May 1945, it was destroyed. (This was the time when the tottering Hitler régime ordered a mass destruction of official documents.) However, the author had retained for his personal use copies of certain parts of it (August 1940 to March 1941) and also fragments of those parts which antedate and follow this period. Furthermore, he had preserved the notes (on which he based his entries into the *Kriegstagebuch*) that deal with the events from August 1942 to March 1943. (It is regrettable that the author does not inform us as to why his collector's instincts failed him for such prolonged periods.) He also made use of certain other documents written by, i. e., Jodl (*Chef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes*) and Warlimont, his deputy.

This book comprises an introduction, eight chapters, an appendix, and an index. The introduction contains (a most welcome inclusion) a *precis* of the *Spitzengliederung der Wehrmachtführung*, of this manifestation of organizational insanity which seeks its equal in the history of human conflict.

The chapters deal with the planning and execution of the campaigns against Poland, France, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the first part of Rommel's African adventure; with the Italian operations in Africa and Greece as far as they affected the decisions of the German High Command; with the planning of the attack on the USSR; and also with the strategic scheming against Gibraltar and the British Isles.

The appendix contains excerpts from the author's notes on the military developments during the crucial and decisive period of August 1942 to March 1943 (Tunisia, Stalingrad). Insufficient sources compelled him wholly to omit from his account the initial phase of the Russian campaign. Because of this gap of 14 months (June 1941 to August 1942), the book does not quite hold what its title promises.

Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung is—despite its documentary limitations and its gap—a solid and informative book. Its author has earnestly tried to live up to his *"geschichtliches Verantwortungegefühl."* Its shortcomings lie in the scanty treatmen of the *Luftwaffe* operations in support of the ground forces.

University of Colorado GERHARD LOOSE

WESTPHAL, SIEGFRIED. *The German Army in the West.* London: Cassel and Company, 1951. Pp. 222.

WESTPHAL, SIEGFRIED. *Heer in Fesseln.* Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1950. Pp. 332.

General Siegried Westphal is well qualified to speak for the officers' corps of the German army and or the professionals of its general staff. He served in the Operations Section of the Army General Staff from 1935 to 1938, with troops for ten months, then as a senior staff officer or chief of staff successively with the Wehrmacht in France and on the German-French armistice commission in 1940, with Rommel in north Africa and France, with Kesselring in Italy, and thereafter with Rundstedt and Kesselring until the surrender. His highest position, nominally, was as chief of general staff to the Supreme Commander, West, in 1945. He was not in OKW.

As is perhaps to be expected of one who spent the war years principally in the rarefied atmosphere of the high command, the General writes at length of strategy, principles, and men both illustrious and infamous. He takes great pains to explain how it happened and, as he and his associates saw it, had to happen that so many decent individuals continued so long to serve with such fidelity in an army which they now say they then saw being led to its ruin by the vulgarian megalomaniac Hitler. He honors those such as Beck, Fritsch, Rommel, and von Witzleben, sturdier or more stubborn than himself, for their outspoken and eventually fatal opposition to the Führer; but he has no reproaches for those who trod as he did the path of military duty as defined for them by their conception of their time-honored code but were not made of the stuff of which marytrs for other principles are made.

General Westphal seems not only to have stayed in line as an officer but now to know also how to take cover by expressng, however unconvincingly, only conventional opinions. The army, which he says was always an entirely reliable instrument of the republic, thought it could maintain its "inner independence" under Hitler while accepting his support for its rehabilitation, and discovered only when it was too late that it could not. Meanwhile the people trusted the army to intervene and restrain the Nazi if necessary, and realized only too late that it had underestimated the ruthlessness and popularity of Hitler and his party. The twelve year term of service, he says, was Beecht's idea. (Forgetting the Treaty of Versailles for once?) There was no secret armament industry. The atrocities were the work of the SS and SD, not the army. The military blunders were committed by Hitler or by his orders, the OKH would have avoided them. Hitler hated and despised the generals, and always kept them handcuffed, yet raved at them because he had to push them into war. Only the boldest of them, such as Rommel, dared to disobey him, and only Rundstedt openly to defy him.

One wonders how an army so handicapped could maintain itself so long against such odds. The answer given is two-fold: especially in adversity, the German soldier is always a good soldier; and the Allies also made mistakes. The French could have reached the Rhine in two weeks in September 1939. The Allies should have taken Tunisia also when they landed in Algeria in 1942. They should have landed nearer Rome than at Salerno, or at Leghorn rather than Anzio, and have saved themselves the trouble of gnawing their way so painfully right up the leg of the boot from toe to top. They would have won the war more quickly by invading the mainland through the Balkans. They might have had their Remagen on the Rhine in October, 1944; there was then no real West Wall. Only Yalta kept the western armies from beating the Russians to Berlin. The "unconditional surrender" formula prolonged the war by stiffening armed resistance and disheartening the German underground.

There is little that is new in this second-guessing of the victors by the vanquished. It is rather refreshing therfore to see the general change his tactics slightly at the end of the campaign and say frankly that the war was lost by Germany before it was begun. Not because of dilettantish leadership by a par-

anoiac layman or of betrayal by the caste-proud professionals but because her enemies were too many and too strong. No former German soldier now, he says, wants to see Germany re-armed. Safety and salvation are to be found only in general disarmament. Peace—it's wonderful!

No one who reads German should waste his time on the English version of this book. Nothing is added, much is lost, and there is no revision but that inadvertently effected by the ineptitude or inaccuracy of the translation. *Schwer* is only "heavy," whether modifying an experience, a disappointment, anxiety, a burden, or a war of attrition. *Aber, noch, immerbin,* and *trotzdem* are indiscriminately translated "all the same." *Die neue Weltanschauung* shrinks in translation to "the outlook." Ungrammatical constructions such as "Neither . . . were . . ." (p. 3) are not uncommon; or like "None . . . knew anything about the affair and were presented '. . . with a *fait accompli.*" (28). The strength of the Luftwaffe (26) is "her" (*ihre*) strength. *Bei* is only "by" (30). *Der Schwerpunkt der Versorgung* is mistranslated (123) "focus of reinforcements." The German says: *Ganz anders waren die Gegner geartet und ausgestattet;* the English: The enemy was quite otherwise in equipment and character" (130). [The] *Gegenangriff der Divisionen Hermann Göring und Napoli auf der Reede von Gela* was not (142) "a counterattack by the Hermann Göring divisions on Napoli." "His anger was extreme" (145) is but a pale ghost of *Er war aufs Äusserste aufgebracht. Der entscheidungssuchende deutsche Angriff* is scarcely recognizable (159) as "The assault which was to bring about this happy end." The *Moselpforte von Trier* is not (174) the mouth of the Mosel, which reaches the Rhine at Koblenz. Something more than "the reception of this army" (187) was needed on the right bank of the Rhine in 1945, and is implied by *eine Aufnahme der Armee.* Words, as *ihm eigene* on page 189, are frequently omitted. *Beherrschung der Meere und des Luftraumes* is surely something more than (198) "supremacy on land and sea"; u. s. w.

University of Wisconsin CHESTER V. EASUM

TOSCANO, MARIO, *Una mancata intesa italo-sovietica nel 1940 e 1941,* Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1953. Pp. 144. Lire 800.

Prof. Toscano has made a valuable contribution to a neglected phase of Axis diplomacy in this succinct analysis of Italy's intermittent approaches for an economic accord with the U.S.S.R. during the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The book is based primarily on a careful study of documents soon to be published in Series IX of the official Italian collection, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 1861-1943* (Rome, Libreria dello Stato). It also makes use of relevant published memoirs and documents of Count Ciano, Augusto Rosso, Gregorio Gafencu, Leonardo Simoni, Dino Alfieri, Mario Donosti, and others, as well as of the U.S. State Department's publications on Nazi-Soviet relations. While the definitive study of this period must await publication of all the Soviet and German sources, as Prof. Toscano points out, this book in the meantime will serve as an invaluable reference.

Toscano divides the period under consideration into five phases, in each of which he analyzes the respective attitudes of Italy, Russia, and Germany: (1) August 23, 1939, until the Italian entry into the war; (2) June 1940 until the eve of the Vienna Arbitration of the Rumanian question; (3) August 1940 until Molotov's visit to Berlin in November; (4) November to December 1940; and (5) the resumption of Italo-Soviet negotiations late in December until their collapse February 24, 1941. The author approaches his topic with a twofold purpose: to discuss the diplomacy from an historical standpoint, and to criticize the technical execution of the policy by the various diplomats, especially the Italians.

Unlike either Molotov or Ribbentrop, Mussolini and Ciano on several occasions revealed a limited understanding of the fundamental problems involved in negotiating with Russia and an inability to carry out negotiations with expert timing. Obviously, Italy was in a poor bargaining position because of inferior military strength, but the Fascist Government failed to play well the cards at its disposal.

For example, the fifth and perhaps most important phase of the negotiations began a month after Molotov's fateful visit to Berlin in November 1940. At that time, Germany in effect had terminated any possibility for a Russo-German accord in the Balkans, but did not inform Italy of the details of these conversations; Italy, for its part, did not consult with Germany before approaching Moscow in December. Neither Mussolini nor Ciano, in spite of warnings from Ambassador Rosso in Moscow, carefully thought out the extent to which Italy would have to make political concessions to Russia in order to obtain a commercial agreement. Optimistically, Rome informed Moscow that it hoped for a commercial agreement and revision of the 1933 non-aggression and neutrality pact, provided that Italy recognized Soviet pre-eminence in the Black Sea and the new Soviet frontiers in return for Russian recognition of Italian pre-eminence in the Mediterranean. But when Molotov quickly demanded concrete statements of Italian policy on specific issues, Rome was unable to provide a speedy answer. Molotov insisted especially upon a clear definition of Italian policy toward the "Straits of the Black Sea" (to use his expression), the nature of future navigation of the Danube now that Russia was a riparian power, and the meaning of the Axis guarantee made to Rumania after the partition of August 1940. Despite urgent entreaties from the Italian Embassy in Moscow, several weeks passed before Rome replied; in that interval, belated consultations with Berlin revealed that Germany was opposed to any Italian accord with Russia which might permit the latter to re-enter the Balkans "by the window" after the "door" had been slammed in Berlin in November. The negotiations quickly collapsed when it became apparent that any entente would be so watered down as to be almost meaningless.

Unlike Japan, which overrode Ribbentrop's objections and signed a pact with the U.S.S.R. April 13, 1941, Italy closed ranks with Germany and voluntarily joined in the attack on the Soviet Union in June.

Vanderbilt University CHARLES F. DELZELL

INGRIM, ROBERT. *After Hitler Stalin?* Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1946. Pp. 255.

INGRIM, ROBERT. *Von Talleyrand zu Molotov.* Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart. 1951. Pp. 339.

Robert Ingrim is an experienced journalist in the field of international relations. Although as a naturalized citizen of the United States he uses the first person plural when referring to "us," he writes as a Central European: born in Austria, former correspondent of the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung, Baseler Nachrichen,* Basel *National Zeitung, and* Zürich *Weltwoche,* sometime League of Nations correspondent of the Amsterdam *Tijd,* again domiciled in Switzerland in 1950—and crusader against communism. He writes forcefully and equally well in both languages here used, still clings to the German practice of calling the United States, "America" and Britian, "England." There are hundreds of direct quotations, well chosen and properly acknowledged, but no documentation.

Von Talleyrand zu Molotov is the author's own translation of his *After Hitler Stalin,* published in 1946, in which the final chapter of the original has been replaced by three new chapters written in 1947 and an epilogue, undated but dating itself apparently about 1950. He points out that the use of the question mark as part of the title of the original was the publisher's idea, not his. The affirmative would have suited him better even then.

The book is in fact an assertion and an elaboration of the thesis that the principal root of the all-pervading evil by which the world is now oppressed is an exaggerated and unregulated nationalism. When nationalism goes to any degree socialist as in Nazi Germany, or when socialism goes nationalist as in Russia, the evil is aggravated. To Ingrim, however, exaggerated nationalism, National Socialism, and the national socialist imperialism of the USSR are all one—and all poison. The only ultimate salvation is in world government. A step toward world government would be a European federation; and a step toward a united Europe would be a federated western Europe—with the United States, of course, supporting and buttressing this twentieth century substitute for the Hapsburg empire as a barrier against Russia.

After Hitler Stalin was the author's prediction written he says, during the last year of the war and published in 1946. "From Talleyrand to Molotov" is indicative of another aspect of the work, a synthesis of history since the Congress of Vienna as interpreted by the author to support his general thesis, much as Marx vindicated his so as to call it "scientific." Briefly, that thesis is that at and since the Congress of Vienna the conservatives have been right. Only they have consistently defended the real values of European civilization or maintained the general conditions in which those values have been or can be created. The fatal error of the twentieth century—except perhaps the rise of socialism in Britian—was the dissolution of the Hapsburg empire. To this native of the upper valley of the Danube, world history has always revolved around the valley of that great river. The "world wars" of all time have been in reality east-west struggles for control of Europe, efforts by the west to prevent Europe's being reduced to the status of a mere peninsula of the continent of Asia. The Austro-

Hungarian empire served that purpose. Now only a firm European federation can take its place. The outer fortifications have already fallen to the enemy, but the citadel still holds. Holding the citadel implies counter-attack to re-possess the outworks.

General Patton, who was not afraid of the conservatives, is called wiser than his superiors and quoted with approval as saying: " 'Reactionaries!' Do you want a lot of communists?" It is no part of the proper function of government, Ingrim says, to feed and clothe its people. Give them security in the military sense and let them maintain themselves. He is no equalitarian offering everyone half a loaf for fear someone may get hold of two loaves. He advocates rather what he calls a MacArthur plan for Germany—cruel at first, then kind, as Machiavelli said.

University of Wisconsin CHESTER V. EASUM

POLLOCK, JAMES K. *and* HOMER THOMAS. *Germany in Power and Eclipse, the Background of German Development.* New York: D. Nostrand, 1952. Pp. viii, 661. $10.00.

More than is usual, the character and qualities of this massive volume are implicit in its origins. Soon after the entrance of the United States into World War II, Professor Pollock and his associates, with the support of the University of Michigan and of the Rackham Foundation of that institution, initiated "the compilation, evaluation, and presentation of the essential facts covering the entire German area, province by province, and state by state." The results in some twenty-two studies were ultimately submitted to the War Department and State Department for use in training of the personnel of military government. After the war, the authors had the happy thought of revising and integrating these studies into a book for general use. They envisage a second volume to deal with Germany after 1939 and during her "eclipse," although the present volume in fact carries into the war period.

There is presented here a vast, well-ordered array of facts. In the first third of the book, the development of the national German state and society is traced from pre-historic times but with chief emphasis upon the period since the formation of the Second Empire under the headings of land and people, government and administration, political movements and parties. The remaining two-thirds consists of sections devoted to the major regions, each of which begins with a brief, general account and continues with the component provinces or states. There is an excellent index, a selective bibliography at the end of each chapter, and some thirty sketch maps illustrate the text. For those aspects of the development of Germany with which the authors have chosen to concern themselves, this book should be a most useful source of information for serious students of Germany.

To criticize books for what the authors have not attempted to do is a favorite sport of reviewers. However, the authors address themselves "to those who desire to acquire a knowledge and understanding of Germany as a whole and of its various parts," and it is doubtful that this book will in fact serve this

purpose satisfactorily. For one thing, even in the present revised form, its emphasis upon administrative institutions, local as well as national, is still more useful for the purpose of military government than for those who desire a well-rounded "understanding of Germany." The latter need would have been better served by more information, for example, about the origins and development of the great industrial cartels such as the I. G. Farben and the A. E. G. Here and there in the discussion of specific localities there are efforts to give the reader a feeling for distinguishing characteristics of the people, but these comments are usually too general to be either convincing or very enlightening in regard to the traits of the German nation. The description of the native of Hamburg, for example, as "a steady dignified person with bourgeois hopes" does not help to explain Hamburg's status as a Communist stronghold in the 1920's. Similar forays into folk psychology occur in the discussion of rural Hesse and Hesse-Nassau and the Saar. The Saarlanders are said to be "highly musical and artistic" and to be comparatively "light-hearted and vivacious." This sort of thing might advantageously have been omitted in favor of an account of the development of German national feeling.

Duke University E. MALCOLM CARROLL

KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN, ERIC von. *Liberty or Equality.* Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. 1952. Pp. 368. $6.00.

This book is a series of essays, several of which have been published previously in periodicals, but which are now brought together, in logical sequence, to support the author's underlying thesis that Liberalism and Democracy are incompatible opposites. The first essay is a mere collection of citations from numerous nineteenth-century authors, such as De Tocqueville, who had premonitory fears that the coming of democracy meant the stifling of the spirit of liberalism. The author then plunges into four analytical essays on democracy, monarchy and Catholicism, which are the most controversial part of the book. The pure democracy which is the object of the author's scorn and contempt simply is not an issue of the twentieth century. Indeed, what government, in the whole history of Western Civilization, has ever attempted to legislate solely in accordance with the whims of the masses? The author reads out the American experience because of its Protestantism, its secular liberalism, and the voluntary origins of its citizens. Considering the proud role of Great Britian in the evolution of democratic institutions which successfully retain a high degree of liberalism even when evolving toward socialism, the almost complete neglect of the British experience in this book is a major criticism.

Professor Kuhnelt-Leddihn is an Austrian, an ardent Catholic and a romantic monarchist. In history, he sees all the virtues of monarchy and all the vices of democracy. For example, it is hard to imagine a more ridiculous bit of special pleading than the argument that ruling families, via inter-marriage, tend to develop special talents for government. (p. 152). The student of history knows that the initiation of democracy has seldom come from faith, so much

as from failure—the miserable failures and inequities of the very hierarchical monarchies which are so eulogized in this book. There is a profound snobbishness about his thesis, for it ignores the creative aspects of democratic government, especially its power to broaden the basis of leadership by bringing forth talent from the whole people, and to minimize coercion through broadening the basis of consent. Though it is rather refreshing to find so much recognition given to the role of religion in moulding history, economics occupy too important a role in the rationale of democracy to be relegated to a few footnotes, and the problem of concentration of power, with all its corrupting effects, is almost completely ignored. An American will hardly concede that democracy must be defined so academically and narrowly as the author insists. For example, checks and balances, so essential to minimize concentration of power, are an essential feature of the American system. Nor can we accept the author's assumption that rulers in a democracy may merely reflect and never mould public opinion.

Another highly questionable thesis of his erudite but unbalanced book is that democracy leads inevitably to totalitarian dictatorship. Even the French Revolution is not a clear case, since the pressure of external danger was the main incentive to dictatorship. And it is surely an untenable thesis that Russia and Central Europe, Italy, Germany and China were previously the world's most complete democracies, and so her most triumphant modern totalitarianisms. Granted that all the dictators tend to use the vocabulary of democracy to cover their tyrannies, there is no reason to take their assertions at face value.

In other words, this book is a remarkable example of an over statement of a case. In its more restrained passages it serves as a wise warning that a democratic sysem is open to dangers of mediocrity and mass tyranny unless it is softened by liberalism and reinforced by a common ethos and religious faith, and unless it is sensitive to the necessity of deferring to educated leadership. The book is also a curious example of unconscious rationalizing to defend the Catholic Church against its great dilemma, namely, that its dogmatic and institutional rigidity makes difficult the concept of multiple approach to truth and the necessity for pragmatic compromise which are essential to a healthy functioning of democratic instituitons.

The last two essays of the book are historical, and shed some interesting light on the more seamy side of Luther's complex personality, upon the relation of the Hussites to Luther, and upon an early National Socialist People's Party in Bohemia which ante-dated Drexler's *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei.*

College of Wooster. AILEEN DUNHAM

KISZLING, RUDOLF, *Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg. Der politischer Lehrmeister Kaiser Franz Josephs*, Graz; Böhlau, 1952. Pp. 240. $2.90.

It is a notable feature of Austrian historiography that the highly controversial figure of Schwarzenberg has been treated in full length biographies ex-

clusively by historians who strongly admire his policies and personality. On the other hand, great scholars like Friedjung, Redlich and Srbik in studies of much wider context have adopted a more critical attitude. All three, while recognizing his courage, energy and diplomatic skill, consider his German policy as risky and, even in his own lifetime, as unsuccessful. They reject the harshness of his Hungarian strategy and his failure to make the demands of the Einheitsstaat compatible with the requirements of the multinational empire. All three—though Srbik less strongly than Friedjung and Redlich — deplore his ultimate flouting of constitutional government and his autocratic methods and aims, in procedure far more radical than Metternich's concepts. It follows from all this that the instructions of Francis Joseph's "Lehrmeister" were of mixed blessing for the young monarch.

On every single one of these counts Kiszling sides with Schwarzenberg, though not without qualifications. He affirms the principles of the Prime Minister's German and Central European policy. He endorses his Hungarian action as justified by the later unquestionable Magyar national intransigence. Yet this is a vaticinatio ex eventu. The argument that a more moderate Hungarian policy between 1849 and 1853 might have led to a saner Magyar policy in the future is not met. Amazingly enough even Schwarzenberg's autocratic policy, in such obvious contradiction to his frequent pledges as to the conduct of constitutional government, is upheld. The author unwittingly does a disservice to the memory of the old emperor and his loyalty to constitutional principles after 1867 when some exasperated remarks that he made to Conrad in the last years of his reign are quoted to deduce his sustained approval of Scwarzenberg's authoritarian absolutism.

All this is not meant to imply that Kiszling is oblivious of errors in Schwarzenberg's policies in several important details. Yet, by and large this criticism is confined to questions of political strategy and does not refer to the far more important ones of political principles. Neither is his assumption being contested here that in the empire's supreme crisis the prince made an important, even decisive contribution to prevent its disintegration. Whether the methods employed did not in several respects more harm than good is a matter of justified historical controversy. Yet the implication should be firmly rejected that Schwarzenberg, beyond his specific action in the Austrian empire crisis of his time, may serve as political guide in our own fight for the establishment of Western democratic ideas in Central Europe, partly threatened and partly oppressed by Communistic dictatorship.

In spite of these grave objections, the serious and careful presentation of this study should be respected. Here, however, another question has to be raised. Kiszling writes in the preface to his book, "The political and human personality of Schwarzenberg is such that it may demand the interest of readers who are not professional historians. For the sake of greater readability I therefore have dropped the customary scholarly documentaion in footnotes and have incorporated them in the text." Certainly the significance of Schwarzenberg's personality would permit a popular presentation and in this case footnotes might well have been dis-

pensed with. Kiszling's presentation however is at points rather technical. It makes by no means easy, though not obscure reading. The fact that the very numerous, on the whole well selected quotations from many sources—except for the brief general bibliography at the end of the book—are not documented, deprives this work of some of the scholarly character to which it otherwise may well lay claim.

The definitive biography of Schwarzenberg has still to be written.

Rutgers University, N. J. ROBERT A. KANN

RIASANOVSKY, NICHOLAS V., *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles; A Study of Romantic Ideology.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. 244. $6.00.

At a time when the complexities of establishing rapport between Russia and the West are daily demonstrated, a work providing new perspective on the problem is of genuine interest. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky of Iowa State University has performed such service by reappraising the views of a group of Russians —the Slavophiles—who for many years of the nineteenth century pondered the historic antipathy between Russia and the West. The result is a book that brings new insight to a widely misunderstood intellectual movement of the last century and deepens the understanding of Russia's longstanding misgivings toward the West.

The book's title might imply that Riasanovsky has directed attention toward only one phase of Slavophilism, Russia and the West. This theme, as is widely known, represented the root of all Slavophile thinking. In analyzing the subject, however, the author has also provided a comprehensive survey of the general doctrines of the Slavophiles. His conclusions rest largely upon a careful re-reading of the works of the Aksakovs, the Kireevskii's, Khomiakov, and Samarin. These he identifies as the "true leading Slavophiles." His assumption that the doctrines of the movement can be measured successfully from the works of its six leading exponents appears valid and has greatly simplified the evaluation. As Riasanovsky has explained, Koshelev, Valuev, and a score of others belonged to the movement, but made only a small contribution to its doctrines.

The Slavophiles, as the author makes clear, were a group of rural-minded intellectuals closely united by common blood ties and economic background. They never formally organized as a movement, nor did they demand conformity of their members, but in the course of their ruminations on the past and present and of Russia's role in both, they arrived at conclusions that were expanded into a well-defined ideology.

The Slavophile ideology was simultaneously national, romantic and paradoxical. History, society, and life they interpreted in romantic and national terms. The West was attacked for numerous false values, principles, and institutions. These perversions the Slavophiles feared might engulf the world. But Russia had the antidote and the Slavophiles the formula. The Slavophile "mes-

sage" was universal in its application although national in its concept of a "chosen people," the Russian peasants. Despite their condemnation of the West and its institutions, the Slavophiles were strongly influenced by western culture and particularly by German nationalist philosophy. Their doctrines, as Riasanovsky sees them, were based on a dichotomy termed "We" and "They." Russia was always 'We,' the West was always 'They.'." This bifocular view of the world colored the entire range of Slavophile thinking and the author repeatedly employs the two terms in describing various aspects of Slavophile teaching and argument.

The value of the movement, Riasanovsky asserts, lay in its "emphasis on the fundamental problems of human faith, motivation and life, and its attempt to find the basis for a true Christian society." Because the Slavophiles failed to find acceptable answers to the great questions of the ages is no reason to belittle their efforts or to underestimate their great influence in Russian intellectual thought.

This reviewer finds no quarrel with Riasanovsky's arguments or organization of material. His book is well-written, sound, and informative. If one were to single out any fault in the presentation it might be a superabundant use of quotations in particular chapters (iii, iv). While these are invariably pertinent, there are too many of them and they are sometimes overly long. The publisher has complicated matters by arranging the quotations on a number of pages in such a way that they tend to merge with the footnotes. Since both footnotes and quotations appear in reduced type and frequently in juxtaposition, the result is sometimes confusing. One also cannot avoid noting the high price of the volume ($6.00). With all due sympathy to the publishers in days of rising production costs, it is regrettable that a work of such unusual interest and modest length (244 pp.) could not be offered the public at lower cost. But these must be very secondary considerations in the judgment of a book that is from every standpoint outstanding. Riasanovsky has written the most admirable analysis of the Slavophiles that has appeared in English, and one would have to search far to find its equivalent in any language.

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SHORTER NOTICES

RUDOLF RICAN, ed., *Čtyři Vyznání*, Prague: Comenius (formerly Hus) Theological Faculty, 1951. Pp. 412.

In answer to a demand from the several Czech and Slovak Protestant groups, several scholars from the Komenský (Prague) and the Slovak Protestant (Bratislava) theological schools compiled this work. The plan of the work is simple and at the same time ambitious. The four creeds of the early church, Apostolic, Nicene, Chalcedonian and Athanasian, are presented in a new Czech translation with brief scholarly orientation, and then the properly Czecho-Slovak Protestant interest takes over. The Four Articles of Prague, here placed in the autumn of 1419, are reprinted from Palacký's 1844 text, with elaborate scholarly notes. The Augsburg Confession of 1530, which first appeared in a Czech translation in 1540, and frequently since, is here presented in a new translation based on both the German original and the contempoary Latin [illegible] approved by Luther. The persistence of Lutheranism in certain parts of Czechoslovakia is perhaps more significant than generally recognized. The *Confessio* of the *Unitas fratrum* appeared first in 1535, and was republished 16 times before the White Mountain. The text here presented is that printed by Komenský himself in Amsterdam in 1662. This is followed by the somewhat longer *Confessio Helvetica* prepared by Bullinger in 1561, and revised in 1564 and published in 1566. The last of the numerous creeds which had currency and influence in Bohemia and neighboring lands was the *Confessio bohemica* of 1575, which was an attempt to combine and conciliate the various Protestant groups so as to make a common front against the Catholic Hapsburgs. The text here offered is largely based on the text of F. Hrejsa, with slight improvements from the official text of 1608. The book is abundantly supplied with helpful indexes and a glossary of persons referred to in the notes. It is a mine of useful information on the turmoiled story of Czech and Slovak Protestantism.

S. H. THOMSON

HUBATSCH, WALTER, *Die Deutschen und der Norden; ein Beitrag zur politischen Ideengeschichte vom Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart in Dokumenten.* Göttingen: Otto Schwartz, 1951. Pp. 147.

Professor Walther Hubatsch of the University of Göttingen has assembled 142 extracts from the writings of prominent Germans concerned with the Scandinavian North during the past four centuries. The citations are arranged in ten chronological sections and are connected by an explanatory text which gives unity to the selections. A useful bibliography and index are added at the end.

The author's aim was to present, from contemporary sources, the changing views of the North which Germans have held during various periods of modern European history. To judge the volume and quality of his recent scholarly production in the fields of Scandinavian and Prussian history, Hubatsch deserves, at the age of thirty-eight, the title of Germany's outstanding younger specialist on the Baltic-Scandinavian area and is therefore well qualified for the task he has undertaken.

Despite his excellent qualifications, certain reservations can be made regarding this book. The author is inconsistent when he states that the problem

of Schleswig-Holstein has been purposely removed (pp. 13-14) and then includes three quotations directly concerned with it (pp. 103-106). There is a certain tendency to use some quotations more for the importance of the authors than for the value of the quotations themselves. For example, Hubatsch has chosen to include the sections from Bismarck's letters to his wife which tell of his hunting trip to Scandinavia in 1857 and which have nothing at all to do with the "political history of ideas." There is also some lack of balance. In one section, ten of thirteen citations are from Theodor Fontane and in the last section, fourteen out of nineteen from Rainer Maria Rilke. As far as the former is concerned, it seems unfortunate that a better selection of quotations to indicate the importance which late nineteenth century Scandinavian letters exercised on German literature was not found. The binding commentary is, in general, both accurate and well written. To be consistent, the author should have spelled "Lorenz" *Lars* and "Erich" and "Erichson" *Erik and Eriksson*. At times one could wish for a few supplementary bits of information. The comments accompanying the four selections from Ernst Moritz Arndt might have mentioned that Arndt was born a Swedish subject (in Hither Pomerania) and was a convinced Swedish particularist before becoming an ardent German nationalist. It seems doubtful that the Danish romantic poet Oehlenschläger should be included simply because of the German birth of his father. The quotations stop with the coming of Hitler, although there is a brief commentary at the end of the book which brings the story up to the present. In a way, this is a pity for *der nordische Gedanke* assumed perhaps larger proportions and importance in National Socialist Germany than during any previous period.

Die Deutschen und der Norden is interesting and worthy of attention for the author's attempt to trace the changing German ideas of Scandinavia. Hubatsch has succeeded in presenting a convincing picture of constant revision in some Central Europeans' views of Northern Europe during the Modern Age.

University of California, Los Angeles. ERNEST EKMAN

BRATUS, TADEUSZ, et al., edd., *Polacy - ewangelicy na Dolnym Śląsku w XIX w. i ich postawa narodowo-społeczna*, II. Poznań, Instytut Zachodni, 1951. Pp. 247.

The first part of this study of the social and national situation of the Poles in Lower Silesia during the nineteenth century was published in 1950. Like the present volume, it consisted of selected documents which showed the depth and extent of Polish resistance to germanization and the brutal measures adopted by the German government and large land owners to root out the Polish language in school and church. The present collection of documents is focused around six selected areas or *causes célèbres* (only one deals with Polish Catholics, that on Sobocisko and Wierzbno in 1814-15) in which Polish Protestants were under pressure to accept German pastors or school teachers against their will. Obviously much progress in germanization was made with all the weapons of government control on one side. What is amazing however, is that, after fifty years of concentrated propaganda and enforcement, there was still so much and so determined resistance on the part of Polish Protestants against their German co-religionists. It is ironically amusing to read the report of a Ger-

man school teacher that the pupils he has taught read German quite acceptably, but successfully avoided understanding what they read. When more of these documents are published, as they probably will be, the German statistics of 1910-14 on the question of Polonism in Silesia will have to be drastically reinterpreted. It is to be hoped that a similar documentation of the germanization of East Prussia may be forthcoming. It might surprise some who regarded this area as strongly and uniformly German.

S. H. Thomson

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